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In 1989, at the urging of Governor Gaston Caperton, the West Virginia
Legislature submitted to the State's voters the County Organization Reform
Amendment, which would have amended Article IX of the West Virginia Con-
stitution to authorize the Legislature to consolidate counties with local voters'
consent,' develop three or more alternative forms of county governance, 2 pro-
vide for county home rule, 3 create city-county governments with local voter
approval,4 and permit increases in local officials' salaries during their terms of
• John W. Fisher, H Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of Law.
Committee Substitute for H.R.J. Res. 12, 1989 ACTS OF THE W. VA. LEGISLATURE 1617,
1618. The proposal would have amended Article IX, § 8 to read:
§ 8. Formation and consolidation of counties; allocation of liabilities.
No new county may hereafter be formed in this state except by the consolida-
tion of counties. The Legislature shall provide by law for the consolidation of
two or more counties or the division of a county and the consolidation of the
division thereof with one or more other counties. No such consolidation may
become effective without the consent of a majority of voters residing within
each county affected who vote on the question. The former areas shall be held
responsible for their respective existing liabilities as provided by law.
Id.
2 Id. at 1618-19. The proposal would have amended Article IX, § 13. The intended effect
would have been the enactment of legislation for counties similar to W. VA. CODE § 8-3-2 (2003),
which sets forth several forms for municipal governance. That section and possibilities for alter-
native forms of county governments are discussed infra at note 136.
3 Id. The proposal would have added "home rule for counties" to the title of Article IX, § 13
and the following sentence to its text: "Any of such forms of [county] organizations and govern-
ments may provide that counties have the power to pass such laws and ordinances relating to their
local affairs as the Legislature may authorize." Id.
4 Id. at 1619-20. The amendment would have created a new section, Article IX, § 14. It
would have authorized city-county consolidation upon separate voter approval from each affected
municipality, county residents living outside the city or cities, and voters who live in an affected
city but outside the county.
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office.5 The electorate rejected the proposal by better than a four to one mar-
gin.6 A decade and a half later, state leaders have once again expressed interest
in local government reform and, in particular, in county consolidation, region-
alization, and city-county governments. For example, after considerable study,
the Governor's Commission on Governing in the 2 1st Century 7 issued its report
in November, 2004, and recommended numerous changes, some of which found
their way into bills introduced in the 2005 legislative session. 8 None, however,
were enacted. Numerous and diverse groups and voices have persistently advo-
cated for, or addressed in some fashion, local government reform.9
5 Id. at 1620. The proposed amendment would have added a § 15 onto Article IX. Section 15
would have repealed Article VI, § 38 as applied to local government officials. Section 38 prohib-
its "the salary of any public officer" from being "increased or diminished during his term of of-
fice." W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 38. But see note 10 infra. By virtue of Article VI, § 33 and Arti-
cle VIII, § 7, §38 does not apply to legislators or Article VIII judicial officers. W. VA. CONST. art.
VI, § 33; W. VA. CONST. art. VII, § 38. The former contains its own restrictions on legislative
pay raises. W. Va. Const. art. VI, § 33.
6 W. VA. BLUE BOOK 440 (Darrell E. Holmes, ed., vol. 84, 2002). The vote was 201,992
against the proposed amendment to 47,847 in support of it. Id. For an extended discussion of the
proposal, see DAVID TEMPLE, Local Government Reorganization in West Virginia, available at
http://www.polsci.wvu.edu/ipa/par/report_6_3.html. The County Organization Reform Amend-
ment actually fared much better than the two other reform amendments put to the voters that year.
The Education Reorganization Amendment (eliminating State Board of Education and transferring
its powers to the Department of Education under the Governor) and the Better Government
Amendment (eliminating the secretary of state, treasurer, and commissioner of agriculture and
transferring their duties to departments created by the Legislature and placed under the governor)
lost by votes of 220,286 to 29,776 and 220,700 to 28,634, respectively. West Virginians were
clearly not in a reform-minded mood in 1989. A 1940 referendum had also rejected a proposal
very similar to the Better Government Amendment. That one lost, 311,096 to 86,402. W. VA.
BLUE BOOK, supra, at 437.
7 The Commission was appointed by Governor Wise in January, 2004, to consider whether
local governmental restructuring could help the State "to provide the most effective and efficient
services, "to increase economic development and provide good jobs," and to "increase[] oppor-
tunities, minimize[] duplication of services, and alleviate[] financial burdens." W. VA. EXEC.
ORD. No. 1-04 (2004); see also Minutes, 4/13/04 Meeting of the Governor's Commission on
Governing in the 21 st Century (State must review local government structure to see if changes are
needed to "attract new businesses, create jobs and provide the most effective services and pro-
grams") (quoting Governor Bob Wise) (copy on file with the author). The Commission included
state legislators, state officials, local government officials, and representatives from business,
labor, and the public.
8 S.B. 158, 7 9th Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2005) (relating to consolidation of municipalities);
S.B. 159, 79 th Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2005) (creating Consolidation of Local Governments Act);
S.B. 160, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2005) (relating to county consolidation). All are available
online at http://www.legis.state.wv.us/.
9 See, e.g., Beth Gorczyca, Talk of Government Consolidation Getting Attention, THE STATE
JOURNAL, June 25, 2004, at 4; Editorial, Our Views Combining Farsighted Leaders Should Posi-
tion Kanawha County for the Future, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, June 25, 2004, at A4. Tom Witt,
Commission Takes Critical Look at Government, THE STATE JOURNAL, June 4, 2004, at 31. An-
other indication of renewed interest in reform is the fact that the core of this article, or some as-
pect of it, has now been publicly presented by the author on ten occasions: Meeting of subcommit-
tee A of the Joint Comm. On Gov. Operations of the W. Va. Legislature, Charleston, W. Va. (Oct.
[Vol. 108
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This article takes the position that neither the 1989 vote rejecting local
government reform nor the State Constitution precludes such reform, including
most all of those measures rejected in 1989.10 Ironically, the Legislature did
not, and does not, need statewide voters' approval to proceed to restructure local
governments; if it wants to create the opportunity for reform, it can. What is
constitutionally required, however, is voter approval at the local level.
The article begins with a brief history of local governments and consti-
tutional reform in West Virginia, describes pertinent constitutional basics, and
then turns to its principal focus, a rendition on each of the provisions of the
West Virginia Constitution that could potentially affect restructuring local gov-
ernments in the state. Along the way, the discussion spills onto diverse issues
around local governance that, it is hoped, will leave the reader with more than
he or she wanted to know about local government law in West Virginia.
I. HISTORY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORM AND CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION
IN WEST VIRGINIA
Local government reform has been a recurrent theme in West Virginia's
history. Even before the State's formation, the western Virginia delegates at-
tending the "Reform Convention of 1851"11 made reformation of the Com-
monwealth's county court systems a high priority. Prior to that time, the courts'
"justices," who performed a county's legislative, executive, and judicial func-
4, 2005); W.V.U. Institute for Public Affairs Forum for Local Government Officials, Charleston,
W. Va. (Sept. 17, 2005); 2nd Annual W. Va. Policy Forum, Charleston, W. Va. (Jan. 9, 2005);
Governor's Comm. on Governing in the 21' Century, Fairmont, W. Va. (June 30, 2005); Constitu-
tional Revision Committee of the W. Va. House of Delegates, Charleston, W. Va. (Jan. 28, 2004
& Jan. 16, 2002); Seminar for the W.V.U. Institute for Public Affairs Training for Local Govern-
ment Officials, Charleston, W. Va. (Sept. 15, 2001); Joint Conference of the W. Va. Counties
Association, the W. Va. School Boards Association, and the W. Va. Municipal League, Flat-
woods, W. Va. (Sept. 7, 2001); Joint Meeting of the W. Va. Senate and House of Delegates
Committees on Government Organizations, Charleston, W. Va. (June 11, 2001). See also R.
Bastress, Constitutional Issues Regarding Creation of Multi-County School Districts (2002),
(copy on file with author).
10 The one reform (other than the elimination of some statewide constitutional offices) that
was proposed in 1989 and that is expressly precluded by the Constitution is the authority to raise
the salaries of local government officials during their terms of office. As noted in note 5, supra,
Article VI, § 38 bars such in-term adjustments. As a further irony, that is the one 1989 proposal
that the Legislature has enacted regardless of the vote; it has (twice since 1989) raised the salaries
of county officials by finding that it has imposed upon each of them new and additional duties that
justify immediate increases without violating § 38. W. VA. CODE § 7-7-1 (2003); see also Act of
Mar. 8, 1996, H.B. 4864, 1996 Acts of the Legislature of W. Va. 196. The Supreme Court has
sustained that rationale, at least where the new duties are substantial or are beyond the scope or
range of prior duties. See generally, State ex rel. Goodwin v. Rogers, 158 W.Va. 1041, 217 S.E.2d
65 (1975); Delardas v. County Court, 155 W.Va. 776, 186 S.E.2d 847 (1972); Springer v. Board
of Educ., 117 W.Va. 413, 185 S.E. 692 (1936).
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tions, were appointed to office and served for "good behavior" - which
amounted to life terms - and frequently controlled the appointments of both
their successors and other county officers. 12 These "self-perpetuating oligar-
chies ' 13 were described by Thomas Jefferson as "the most afflicting of tyran-
nies." 14 The 1851 Constitution of Virginia addressed some of the problems by
providing for the election of justices and other county officials, but it continued
to confer mixed powers on the justices. 5 West Virginia's first constitution,
adopted in 1863, looked a lot like its predecessor Virginia Constitution,' 6 but
one of the significant changes was the elimination of the county courts and the
installation of a township system modeled after those in New England. Appar-
ently, consensus existed among the framers that the concentration of power in
the county courts was not productive of good government. 17 Under the new
system, each county was divided into three to ten townships. Voters in each
township met as in a New England town meeting to conduct business and to
elect a supervisor, other executive officers, and - separately - justices of the
peace. 18 The supervisors elected by the townships then served on the Board of
Supervisors, which functioned as the county's legislative and administrative
body.' 9 Voters were given responsibility to elect the sheriff, prosecutor, and
other county officials, 20 and several provisions set forth the operation of the
justice of the peace courts.2
The system had a short life. The Reconstruction period in the State con-
tinued the hostile feelings created by the war. The Republican-controlled gov-
ernment imposed civil disabilities on former rebels, including loss of the right to
vote. The ex-confederates bitterly resented the retaliation, and many were also
upset about leaving Virginia. Thus, when the southern-leaning Democrats took
over in 1871, following a clearly incorrect ruling by a federal court that the dis-
enfranchisement of former rebels violated the Fifteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, they immediately put in motion the submission to
the voters of a referendum on whether to call a constitutional convention.22 The
12 DEBATES & PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF WEST VIRGINIA
443 (C. Ambler ed., Gentry Brothers Printing 3d ed. 1861-63).
13 A.E. DICK HOWARD, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA 787 (2d ed. 1974).
14 Id., quoting Letter to John Taylor, July 21, 1816, in WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 53
(Forded., vol. 10).
15 HOWARD, supra note 13, at 787-88.
16 BASTRESS, supra note 11, at 10-11.
17 DEBATES & PROCEEDINGS, supra note 12, at 439-43.
18 Id. at 445-50, 874-75.
19 Id. at 875.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 876-77.
22 BASTRESS, supra note 11 at 15-18; Milton Gerofsky, Reconstruction in West Virginia, Part
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referendum passed, the convention began in January, 1872, and the voters later
that year ratified its work. Dominated by former confederates intent on elimi-
nating every vestige of Yankee influence in the Constitution, the convention
eliminated the township system and re-instated Virginia's county courts with
their judges exercising legislative, executive, and judicial duties.23  That ar-
rangement was also quickly changed. In 1880, the first amendment to the 1872
Constitutions set up the three-judge court and took away most of the county
judges' judicial powers and assigned them to justices of the peace and circuit
24judges.
Calls for reform arose periodically throughout the twentieth century. In
1903, Governor Albert White contended in a legislative address that the State's
Constitution "creaks at almost every joint., 25 Although five amendments were
proposed and ratified,2 6 further reform did not ensue. In 1929, Governor Wil-
liam Conley appointed a Constitutional Review Commission, which filed its
final report with him on December 1, 1930. Four of its proposals had in the
preceding month been submitted to the people and rejected.27 Among other
things, the Commission recommended several provisions regarding local gov-
ernment. They included the reallocation of county courts' probate duties to the
circuit courts and the creation of the office of county treasurer to collect and
handle county funds.2 8 More significantly, the Commission proposed authoriz-
ing counties to consolidate and to permit two or more of them to combine of-
fices (such as sheriff or prosecuting attorney). 29 None of those was submitted to
the voters, at least not before 1988. Three other proposals -- one creating a
more unified executive branch, establishing "summary courts" in each county,
and modernizing the budget process - were put to the voters in 1940 but were
soundly defeated.30  Only one Commission recommendation was enacted, al-
23 BASTRESS, supra note 11, at 20-21.
24 Act of Mar. 7, 1879, ch. XLIX, 1879 Acts of the Legislature of W. Va. 72; Joint Resolution
No. 10, 1879 Acts of the Legislature of W. Va. 175; W. VA. BLUE BOOK supra note 6, at 435.
25 BASTRESS, supra note 11, at 21 (quoting MAUD FULCHER CALLAHAN, THE EVOLUTION OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF WEST VIRGINIA (1909)).
26 W. VA. BLUE BOOK, supra note 6, at 435. The amendments authorized a voter registration
law, provided for the election of a secretary of state, authorized the Legislature to set salaries for
officials (other than the Legislature), expanded the Supreme Court of Appeals to five justices, and
amended the irreducible school fund provision. Id.
27 Id. at 436; Letter from Gov. William G. Conley to the W. Va. Legislature, Jan. 28, 1931, J.
OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES OF W. VA. 107-14 (1931 Reg. Sess.). The rejected amendments
would have authorized the Legislature to increase the number of circuit judges, created the posi-
tion of lieutenant governor, reallocated county courts' probate duties, and revised the budget proc-
ess.
28 Id. at 108-09, 112. Governor Conley argued that establishing a county treasurer's office
would "avoid much duplication of offices and effort and should result in improved financial
methods and accounting." Id. at 112.
29 Id. at 114.
30 W. VA. BLUE BOOK, supra note 6, at 437. Each was defeated by about a 3-1 margin.
2005]
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though it was an important one. In 1936, the voters ratified the Municipal
Home Rule Amendment, which authorized cities to create their own charters
and enhanced their law-making powers.31
After the war, new cries for reform were heard. Writing in 1950, West
Virginia University political scientist Albert Sturm contended that the Constitu-
tion's Article IX on local government
outlines an antiquated plan of county government for an era and
conditions long past. With rigid requirements of ancient vin-
tage frozen into the basic law, almost insuperable obstacles to
reorganization of county government are presented. The great
variation in local needs of West Virginia's fifty-five counties
cannot be taken into account, for the Constitution pours them all
into one mould. Nor is there any definite constitutional basis
for consolidation of local units or for cooperative arrangements
between political subdivisions of the State. In West Virginia,
considerable economy and greater local efficiency could be
achieved by elimination of unnecessary units and by coopera-
tive agreements for functional consolidation.32
A leading textbook on West Virginia government in 1963 contained this
characterization:
In any study of West Virginia county government, a student
will be particularly impressed by the scattered, disjointed, and
irresponsible type of organization that exists in all fifty-five
counties. The present county government has no responsible
head; it is without a chief administrative officer and the county
court controls through appointment only a small part of the
county administration. The voters of the county have very little
power in the determination of county policies. In fact, there is
nothing to commend the present form of county government in
West Virginia.33
Meanwhile, the Legislature took some action. In 1957 it created a
Commission on Constitutional Revision, which ultimately filed five annual re-
ports between 1959 and 1963. 34 Included among the Commission's recommen-
31 The Municipal Home Rule provision, W. VA. CONST., art. VI, § 39a, is discussed in the text
at notes 104-107, infra.
32 ALBERT L. STURM, THE NEED FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION IN WEST VIRGINIA 54 (1950).
33 CLAUDE J. DAVIS, et al., WEST VIRGINIA STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 466 (1963).
34 FiFTH REPORT OF THE W. VA. COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION (1963) (on file
with the W. Va. Collection of the W.V.U. Libraries) (proposing changes to Articles III & IV of
the Constitution); 1962 J. OF THE W. VA. SENATE 261; 1961 J. OF THE W. VA. SENATE 153 (propos-
[Vol. 108
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dations was a rewrite of Article IX, the article on local governments. The pro-
posal advocated converting the old Article VIII county courts into Article IX
county commissions, a proposal that eventually became part of the ratified Judi-
cial Reorganization Amendment of 1974. 35  The Commission also proposed
authorizing the Legislature to enact laws for the consolidation of counties, for
the creation of optional forms of county governance, and for consolidated city-
county governments,36 and those sections eventually became the substance of
the three sections rejected by the voters in the 1989 referendum on the County
Organization Reform Amendment.
A persistent proponent for constitutional change throughout the sixties
was Hewlitt Smith, who was governor from 1965 until 1969. Smith advocated a
constitutional convention to overhaul the constitution and to act on the recom-
mendations of the Commission. His support of a convention was a major part of
his platform in the 1960 gubernatorial primary,37 which he lost to Wally Barron.
Four years later, he again campaigned on the promise to push for a convention
and delivered on that promise in his first state-of-the-state address when he told
legislators:
The operation of our state government today is severely limited
and often made more costly by provisions of a state constitution
written over 93 years ago .... In an effort to strengthen our
governmental structure, I am recommending a constitutional
convention .... and I urge you to take appropriate legislative
38action to accomplish this purpose.
The Legislature responded. On the last day of the 1965 session, it passed a bill
that called for submission to the voters the question of whether to call a conven-
ing changes to Articles VII - IX); 1960 J. OF THE W. VA. SENATE 199; 1959 J. OF THE W. VA.
SENATE 902 (proposing a Preamble, modification of sovereign immunity, changes to the amend-
ment process, and offering a draft for a new Article VIII). The voters in 1960 approved the
Commission's proposals for a Preamble and alterations to Article XIV's procedures for amend-
ments. The Commission's work also contributed substantially to subsequent adoption of the
Modem Budget Amendment (1968) (adopting the Commission's proposal but adding a line item
veto procedure), the Governor's Succession Amendment (rejected in 1966 but ratified in 1970),
and the Judicial Reorganization Amendment (1974). In addition to proposing those later-adopted
changes, the Commission endorsed some of the concepts rejected by the voters in the 1989 refer-
enda on reorganizing county governments and the executive branch. See notes 3-6, supra.
35 1961 J. OF THE W. VA. SEN. 188-89. Those proposed revisions now form parts of Article IX,
§§ 9 & 10 of the West Virginia Constitution. The 1974 recasting of county courts as county
commissions did not significantly alter county governance, however.
36 Id. at 190-91.
37 Thomas F. Stafford, Refurbished Rural Housing Smith Aim, CHARLESTON GAZETrE-MAIL,
Jan. 17, 1965, at Al.
38 Text of Gov. Smith's Address to Legislature, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Jan. 20, 1965, at 22;
see also Thomas F. Stafford, Smith Asks for Better State, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Jan. 20, 1965, at
2005]
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tion and that established the process for holding the convention if the vote was
positive.39 Unfortunately, the less populated counties insisted that every county
have at least one delegate in the constitutional convention, which caused a sub-
stantial deviation from one-person-one-vote principles in the apportionment of
convention delegates. 40 The Smith administration recognized that action threat-
ened the constitutionality of the convention, since Article II, § 4 provides that,
"in all apportionments of representation, equality of numbers of those entitled
thereto, shall as far as practicable, be preserved. 41 Smith therefore brought a
test case to determine the Act's constitutionality. The Supreme Court ruled that
the malapportionment rendered the Act invalid; citizens were entitled to equal
representation at the convention.42 Smith considered calling a special legislative
session to correct the defect and authorize a new convention 43 but ultimately
decided to wait until the 1966 legislative session and reintroduce the convention
bill.44
At that time, sessions in even-numbered years ran for only thirty days
and the Legislature could only consider the budget and subjects specified by the
Governor in a pre-session proclamation or by a joint resolution receiving at least
39 Act of Mar. 13, 1965, H.B. 861 1965 Acts of the Legislature of W. Va. 109; Schools Gain:
$35 Million Educational Package Given Approval, Sent to Governor, CHARLESTON GAZETrE-
MAIL, 1965, at 1 (on file with author). Part of the difficulty of proceeding by the convention route
was that Article XIV, § 1 requires three separate statewide votes to successfully enact a conven-
tion-drafted constitution or constitutional changes: one to decide whether to have a convention,
one to elect delegates to the convention, and one to vote on the convention's proposals.
40 Act of Mar. 13, 1965, H.B. 861 1965 Acts of the Legislature of W. Va. 109; Court Hands
Down Convention Opinion, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Sept. 8, 1965, at 1; Six to Join in Court Test,
CHARLESTON GAZETrE, July 17, 1965, at 13.
41 In the preceding year, the State Supreme Court had ruled that the 60 year practice of ensur-
ing at least one delegate per county violated Article VI, § 6, to the extent that any county's popu-
lation fell below three-fifths of the mean population for a delegate. Robertson v. Hatcher, 148
W.Va. 239, 258, 135 S.E.2d 675, 687 (1964). That decision also portended the invalidity of the
convention's apportionment. Id.
42 State ex rel. Smith v. Gore, 150 W.Va. 71, 76, 143 S.E.2d 791, 795 (1965). The Court
issued its decision in July, 1965, and followed with an opinion explaining its reasoning in Sep-
tember of that year.
43 Smith to Air Convention Next Week, CHARLESTON GAZETrE, July 31, 1965, at 11; John G.
Morgan, Governor to Ask Solons for New Delegate Setup: Extra Legislative Session Studied,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE, July 28, 1965, at 1; see also Special Session on Constitution Proposal
Urged: Rep. Moore Suggests Gov. Smith Act Fast, CHARLESTON GAZETrE, 1965, at 1 (on file with
author). Meanwhile, a private citizens group organized to campaign for constitutional revision
and editorials endorsed it. E.g., Constitutional Convention Resought, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Jan.
17, 1966, at 19; Editorial, Silence Won't Produce Constitutional Changes, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE, Dec. 28, 1965, at 4; Supporters of Constitutional Convention Launch Mail Drive,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Dec. 12, 1965, at A15; Ills Blamed on Old Constitution, CHARLESTON
GAZETrE, Dec. 5, 1965, at B5; Constitutional Parley Backed, CHARLESTON GAZErE, Dec. 1,
1965, at A15; see also Editorial, Half a Loaf or Even One Slice Is Better than Nothing at All,
CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Feb. 1, 1968, at 14.
44 Revision Killed for 1965, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Sept. 28, 1965, at 1.
[Vol. 108
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a two-thirds majority in each house.45 Smith gave the Legislature 46 issues to
address in his call for the 1966 session, and they included submission to the
voters of two constitutional amendments approved by the 1965 Legislature and
the question of calling a constitutional convention.46 Smith's state-of-the-state
address again highlighted the need for the convention, and its urging prompted
one of only six interruptions for applause during the talk.47 Despite that initial
enthusiasm and support from legislative leadership,4 8 the bill to set the conven-
tion process in motion failed to gather the momentum it needed to be passed in
the short session.49
A year later, Governor Smith was again pushing for a convention bill
and expressing particular concern "about needed constitutional reforms to re-
move the handicaps under which county and municipal governments now func-
tion."50 His bill passed the House of Delegates and had strong support in the
Senate, but it did not emerge from committee until only two days remained in
the session. It then fell one vote shy of garnering the four-fifths vote required to
waive the constitutional requirement that a bill must be read on three separate
days.51 The administration's bill was re-introduced the following year by the
Senate President and the Speaker of the House,52 but the bill died in commit-
tee.53
Meanwhile, the Legislature put before the electorate several proposed
amendments to implement the recommendations of the Constitutional Revision
Commission and to modernize the Constitution, but the voters persistently re-
45 That remained the practice until the Legislative Improvement Amendment of 1970 changed
Article VI, § 22 to adopt annual 60 day sessions without subject matter restrictions. See
BASTRESS, supra note 11, at 145-46, for the various permutations that § 22 has gone through.
46 Here Are Issues in Call to Legislature, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Dec. 31, 1965, at 5.
47 John G. Morgan, Smith Urges Fund to Aid Institutions, CHARLESTON GAZETrE, Jan. 13,
1966, at 1.
48 E.g., James F. Dent, Legislature Budget Session Held Inadequate by Carson, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE, Jan. 15, 1966, at 11 (Senate President says the short session was "only one of the points
in favor of a constitutional convention to redraw West Virginia's Constitution").
49 E.g., Post-session review, Legislature Left Several Major Bills in Hopper, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE, Feb. 11, 1966, at 17; Smith Not Supporting Drive for Convention, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE, Feb. 2, 1966, at 2 (Governor said the administration had not "been able to rally enough
popular support... to bring it to an issue" at that time); John G. Morgan, Convention End Sealed
in Senate, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Jan. 28, 1966, at 17.
50 John G. Morgan, Full Circle: Governor Expected to Push Constitutional Convention,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Jan. 8, 1967, at 1; see also John G. Morgan, State Needs More Cash,
Smith Says, CHARLESTON GAZETrE, Jan. 12, 1967, at 1 (reporting on state-of-the-state address's
call for convention); Complete Text of Gov. Smith's Speech to the Legislature, id. at 5.
51 John G. Morgan, Effort to Rescue Convention Bill Fails in Senate, CHARLESTON GAZETTE,
Mar. 11, 1967, at 1; see also Killed: Constitutional Convention Bill Put to Death by Senate,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE-MAIL, Mar. 12, 1967, at 1. The three-reading requirement appears in W.
VA. CONST., art. VI, § 29.
52 Legislature Gets Two Convention Bills, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Jan, 23, 1968, at 2.
53 Constitution Reform Bill Stays Buried, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Feb. 2, 1968, at 9.
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jected them. In 1962, the people turned down proposals for an executive budget
and for improvements in the legislative process.54 The 1966 Legislature sent
five major reform amendments to the polls, where they all lost, four of them
decisively.55 If adopted, the amendments would have streamlined the amend-
ment process, provided for gubernatorial succession, modernized the judiciary,
improved the amendment process, and reduced the vote necessary to enact ex-
cess levies and school bonds.56
The tide finally turned in 1968, which started a run on modernizing
amendments that succeeded over the ensuing six years in accomplishing a large
portion of the agenda of the Commission and other reformers - all but the pro-
posals regarding local governments. The Modem Budget Amendment of 1968
greatly streamlined the budget process and enhanced gubernatorial powers.57 In
1970, voters ratified two more important amendments. The Legislative Im-
provement Amendment established the sixty day annual legislative session58 and
finally resolved the long-standing problem of legislative pay by creating the
Citizens Legislative Compensation Commission. 59 The other amendment pro-
vided that a governor could serve two consecutive terms. 60 The Judicial Reor-
ganization Amendment of 1974 completely overhauled the judiciary, providing
for an integrated judicial branch with considerable rule-making and administra-
tive authority for the Supreme Court and setting up a chief judge (or the circuit
judge in single-judge circuits) as a responsible administrator within each cir-
cuit.6 1 The amendment also eliminated the justice of peace system and replaced
it with the magistrate courts, a considerable improvement.62 In addition to other
54 W. VA. BLUE BOOK, supra note 6, at 438.
55 Id. One amendment, that which would have eliminated the supermajority requirement to
pass excess levies and bonds for support of schools, failed by a margin of 50.7% to 49.3%. Id.
The majorities defeating the other four ranged between 58% and 73%. Id.
56 Id. The cores of all of the rejected proposals were later adopted in some form.
57 See BASTRESS, supra note 11, at 466.
58 That portion of the amendment changed Article VI, § 22, which had previously provided for
60 day sessions in odd-numbered years and 30 day sessions in even-numbered years. During the
latter, the Legislature could consider only the budget bill or subjects identified in a gubernatorial
proclamation or in a joint resolution approved by at least two-thirds of the members in each house.
BASTRESS, supra note 11, at 145-46.
59 W. Va. Const. art. VI, § 33. The Commission consists of seven gubernatorially appointed
citizens who are not legislators or their family members or public employees. The Commission
must follow a specific procedure in making recommendations to the Legislature on compensation
issues. See State ex rel. Holmes v. Gainer, 191 W.Va. 686, 689, 447 S.E.2d 887, 890 (1994). The
Legislature may enact the recommendation, provide for smaller increases, or do nothing. Prior to
the amendment, § 33 set the legislative pay, which meant that the voters had to approve any pay
increase by statewide referendum amending the Constitution. In the nearly 100 years between the
ratification of the Constitution and this amendment, the State had but two legislative pay in-
creases. See generally BASTRESS, supra note 11, at 157-58.
60 W. VA. CONST. art. VII, § 4.
61 See W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1-6; BASTRESS, supra note 11, at 202-11.
62 W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 10; see BASTRESS, supra note 11, at 216-19.
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advances, the amendment changed the name of county courts to county com-
missions. The substantive changes in local government administration, how-
ever, were not significant.
There have been a few constitutional changes of note since 1974. Re-
sponding quickly to the State Supreme Court's decision in Killen v. Logan
County Commission,63 the Legislature proposed and the voters approved the Tax
Limitation Amendment of 1982, which provided that property shall be assessed
at sixty percent of full value and also called for a statewide reappraisal. Eventu-
ally, the amendment, along with litigation, 64 produced a much fairer and more
effective property tax system. Regardless of whether it is viewed as progress or
retrogression, there is no denying that the 1984 amendment authorizing the Leg-
islature to create a state lottery has had a significant impact on state revenues.65
More recent amendments have continued to provide for greater flexibility and
modernization in government financing.66  Finally, a 2000 amendment ad-
dressed another persistent problem and created the system of family courts.
6 7
63 170 W.Va. 602, 295 S.E.2d 689 (1982). Killen held that Article X, § l's "equal and uni-
form" clause required that property in the State be assessed at 100% of full value, instead of some
lesser and unspecified percentage. Id. at 622, 295 S.E.2d at 709. Although the decision did not
necessarily mean that property owners' taxes would go up, that was the popular fear.
64 In addition to Killen, see Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Webster County, 488 U.S. 336,
338 (1989) (using only most recent sale price as basis for appraisal was not rationally related to
creating an equal and uniform tax system because many properties were not sold for long periods
of time and were grossly under appraised).
65 See W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 36. In addition to providing funds into general revenues for
the support of senior citizens' programs, the lottery and its subsequent expansion into other forms
of gaming, see, e.g., W. VA. CODE §§ 29-22B-101, et seq. (2004) (authorizing and establishing
video poker games), have supplied money for the "excess lottery fund," which, in turn, has been
used to pay off bonds sold to finance substantial governmental programs. W. VA. CODE § 18-9D-
6 (2004) (school construction and improvements); W. VA. CODE § 18C-7-7 (2004) (PROMISE
scholarship fund); W. VA. CODE § 29-22-18a (2004) (economic development grants). The Su-
preme Court has upheld both the use of the gaming devices (State ex rel. City of Charleston v. W.
Va. Econ. Develop. Auth., 214 W.Va. 277, 295, 588 S.E.2d 655, 673 (2003)), and the use of the
excess lottery fund to pay off the bonds (State ex rel. W. Va. Citizens Action Group v. W. Va.
Econ. Develop. Grant Comm., 213 W.Va. 255, 273-79, 580 S.E.2d 869, 887-93 (2003); State ex
rel. School Bldg. Auth. v. Marockie, 198 W.Va. 424, 437-38, 481 S.E.2d 730, 743-44 (1996)).
66 Most notably, these amendments included the Modem Investment Management Amend-
ment in 1997, which amended Article X, § 6 to permit the Legislature to establish procedures and
guidelines for 'prudent investment" and eliminating the prior ban on investments in corporate
stocks; the 2002 amendment that created Article X, § 11 allowing counties and cities to have
excess levies for terms up to 5 years; and the 2002 enactment creating Article X, § 8a, which
authorizes local governments to use Tax Increment Financing (issuing revenue bonds to attract
investors and economic development with the bonds to be liquidated through the property taxes on
the increased value of the developed property).
67 See W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 16.
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II. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
There are several basic constitutional principles that bear directly on the
ability to engage in local government reform in West Virginia. The first of
those is that the Legislature's power does not depend upon express grants of
power but is plenary. The only limits on it are those expressly stated in, or nec-
essarily implied from, the United States and West Virginia Constitutions. As
stated by the Supreme Court of Appeals in Robertson v. Hatcher:
[The West Virginia] Constitution being a restriction of power
rather than a grant of power as is the Federal Constitution, the
Legislature may enact any measure which is not specifically
prohibited by the State or Federal Constitution.
This proposition has been succinctly stated by this Court. Quot-
ing from Harbert v. The County Court of Harrison County, 129
W.Va. 54, 39 S.E.2d 177, the Court, in Tanner v. Premier
Photo Service, Inc., 147 W.Va. 37, 125 S.E.2d 609, said: "* * *
The Legislature of this State, unlike the Congress of the United
States under the Federal Constitution, does not depend for its
authority upon the express grant of legislative power. The Fed-
eral Constitution is a grant of power; a State Constitution is a
restriction of power. The Constitution of a State is examined to
ascertain the restraints, if any, which the people have imposed
upon the Legislature, not to determine the powers they have
conferred. The Legislature of this State possesses the sole
power to make laws and it is necessarily invested with all the
sovereign power of the people within its sphere. Booten v. Pin-
son, 77 W.Va. 412, 89 S.E. 985. "68
A corollary to the Legislature's plenary powers principle is that those powers
should be liberally construed to permit maximum flexibility for the State to deal
with unanticipated exigencies and circumstances.69
Second, with very few exceptions, local governments derive their pow-
ers from the Legislature, and except as stated in the Constitution and noted be-
low, the Legislature has complete power over its local governments. This has
been the rule in West Virginia with regards to cities since at least 1915 when
68 148 W.Va. 239, 250-51, 135 S.E.2d 675, 682-683 (1964); accord, e.g., Thorne v. Roush,
164 W.Va. 165, 168, 261 S.E.2d 72, 74 (1979) (the Legislature's "powers are limited only by
express restriction or restrictions necessarily implied by a provision or provisions of our Constitu-
tion").
69 E.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407,415-16 (1819).
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Booten v. Pinson70 held that "[miunicipalities derive all their power as well as
their existence from the legislature, and in the absence of any express constitu-
tional reservations in their favor or express limitations upon the legislative con-
trol over them, they can exercise only such powers as are directly conferred by
their charters.' Since that decision, the State has enacted home rule for cities
in Article VI, § 39a of the West Virginia Constitution, but even that provision
reserves to the Legislature the power to override by general laws any municipal
enactment.72 Counties do not have home rule, and as will be developed below,
they are also totally beholden to the State for their existence. Likewise, local
school districts in West Virginia are subject to the control of the State Board of
Education, at least when that control is not wielded arbitrarily.73
Third, the United States Constitution imposes very few restrictions on
the states regarding their relationships with their local governments. As stated
by the Supreme Court long ago in its unchallenged decision in Hunter v. City of
Pittsburgh 74:
Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the State,
created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the gov-
ernmental powers of the State as may be entrusted to them ...
The number, nature and duration of the powers conferred upon
these corporations and the territory over which they shall be ex-
ercised rests in the absolute discretion of the State. Neither
their charters, nor any law conferring governmental powers, ...
constitutes a contract with the State within the meaning of the
Federal Constitution. The State, therefore, at its pleasure may
modify or withdraw all such powers, may take without compen-
sation such property, hold it itself, or vest it in other agencies,
expand or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a part
of it with another municipality, repeal the charter and destroy
the corporation. All this may be done, conditionally or uncon-
ditionally, with or without the consent of the citizens, or even
against their protest. In all these respects the State is supreme,
and its legislative body, conforming its action to the state con-
stitution, may do as it will, unrestrained by any provision of the
Constitution of the United States .... The power is in the State
70 77 W.Va. 412, 89 S.E. 985 (1915), overruled on other grounds by, Marra v. Zink, 163 W.
Va. 400, 256 S.E.2d 581 (1979).
71 Id. at 421, 89 S.E. at 989.
72 A proviso in § 39a states that any municipal charter provision or ordinance shall be invalid
"if inconsistent or in conflict with . . . the general laws of the State[.]" Municipal home rule is
further discussed, infra, at notes 104- 136.
73 E.g., Bd. of Educ. of County of Kanawha v. W. Va. Bd. of Educ., 184 W.Va. 1, 5, 399
S.E.2d 31, 35 (1990); Leonhart v. Bd. of Educ., 114 W.Va. 9, 14, 170 S.E.2d 418, 420 (1933).
74 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
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and those who legislate for the State are alone responsible for
any unjust or oppressive exercise of it.75
For federal constitutional purposes, then, local governments are creatures of the
State and subject to its dictates. Article IV, § 4 of the United States Constitution
does provide that "[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in this Un-
ion a Republican Form of Government," but the clause is not judicially enforce-
able. 76 Presumably, it requires that the states must provide for democratic elec-
tions at the state level, but it has never been thought to affect how a state ar-
ranges its local governments. A state is under no federal obligation to provide
for elections at the local level, although if it does, the Fourteenth Amendment
does require that it accord citizens the right to a vote of equal weight in elections
of general purpose governments.7 The only other restraints are that the State
may not create or regulate local governments in ways that are invidiously dis-
criminatory (e.g., actions that have a racially prejudicial motive and effect)78 or
that violate local citizens' rights expressly or implicitly guaranteed to them by
the federal constitution or statutes. 79 These requirements are easily satisfied and
rarely present issues for reformers of local government.
Finally, the West Virginia Bill of Rights, Article III of the Constitution,
imposes essentially the same limits8° on the State as does the federal constitu-
75 Id. at 178-79.
76 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4; Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Or., 223 U.S. 118, 147-51 (1912);
Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, 42-48 (1849).
77 This is the one-person-one-vote limitation established by Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,
562-64 (1964), and extended to local governments in Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist., 397 U.S. 50,
54-59 (1970), and Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474,478-79 (1968). Some limited purpose
governments may not be subject to the requirement. See, e.g., Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355, 368
(1981); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719, 725-28 (1973).
78 This limitation is imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause; it
strictly limits a State's ability to classify along the lines of race, national origin, sex, and (to a
lesser extent) illegitimate birth status, and also holds that any classification must have some ra-
tional basis. The latter is extremely easy to satisfy, see, e.g., U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S.
166, 168-80 (1980), and the "suspect classifications" test would hardly ever be used in pursuing
local government reform. For examples of the rare occasions when the Equal Protection Clause
has overturned a state's manipulation of its local governments, see Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S.
613, 627 (1982) (state's maintenance of at-large elections of county commissioners in order to
negate blacks' voting rights violated equal protection); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 346-
48 (1960) (statute that created an "uncouth" 28-sided city and thereby gerrymandered almost all
blacks out of city was invalid); see also cases cited in notes 164-65, infra.
79 These fundamental rights make a short list. They include the implied rights of privacy and
interstate travel, and the First Amendment freedoms of speech, press, religion, assembly, associa-
tion, and the right to petition the government for redress of grievances. Obviously, these rights
would rarely be implicated in structuring local governments.
80 There are some differences between West Virginia's protection of individual rights and the
federal constitution's protection of them, see generally, BASTRESS, supra note 11, at 44-112; John
Patrick Hagen, Policy Activism in the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, 89 W. VA. L. REV.
149 (1986); Thomas B. Miller, The New Federalism in West Virginia, 90 W. VA. L. REV. 51
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tion, and as a consequence, would not significantly affect a restructuring of local
government.
I1. WEST VIRGINIA CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The ensuing discussion considers seriatim potentially relevant provi-
sions and, with a few exceptions does so, in order of their appearance in the
Constitution.
Article II, § 1 - Section 1 defines the territory of the State by listing its
counties, as they existed in 1872 and by more general descriptions. It is clear
for two reasons that the listing of the counties implies no requirement for their
preservation or integrity. Most obviously, and as expanded on below, 82 Article
IX, § 8 provides for the formation of new counties. Second, the 1863 West Vir-
ginia Constitution had an equivalent provision,83 and four new counties were
created under its reign,84 which lead to the conclusion that the list of counties
merely defined the State's territory as of 1872 and did not create any constitu-
tional status for the listed counties.
Article VI, § 39 - Section 39 limits the Legislature's ability to enact
"local" or "special" laws.85 The latter "include laws that focus on individual
(1987); Gene R. Nichol, Dialectical Federalism: A Tribute to the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals, 90 W. VA. L. REv. 91 (1987), but the differences are neither extensive nor particularly
relevant to this article.
81 The full text of W. VA. CONST. art. II, § 1 states:
The State. The territory of the following counties, formerly parts of the
commonwealth of Virginia, shall constitute and form the State of West Vir-
ginia, viz:
The counties of Barbour, Berkeley, Boone, Braxton, Brooke, Cabell, Calhoun,
Clay, Doddridge, Fayette, Gilmer, Grant, Greenbrier, Hampshire, Hancock,
Hardy, Harrison, Jackson, Jefferson, Kanawha, Lewis, Lincoln, Logan,
Marion, Marshall, Mason, McDowell, Mercer, Mineral, Monongalia, Monroe,
Morgan, Nicholas, Ohio, Pendleton, Pleasants, Pocahontas, Preston, Putnam,
Raleigh, Randolph, Ritchie, Roane, Summers, Taylor, Tucker, Tyler, Upshur,
Wayne, Webster, Wetzel, Wirt, Wood and Wyoming. The State of West Vir-
ginia includes the bed, bank and shores of the Ohio river, and so much of the
Big Sandy river as was formerly included in the Commonwealth of Virginia;
and all territorial rights and property in, and jurisdiction over, the same, here-
tofore reserved by, and vested in, the Commonwealth of Virginia, are vested
in and shall hereafter be exercised by the State of West Virginia. And such
parts of the said beds, banks and shores as lie opposite, and adjoining the sev-
eral counties of this State, shall form parts of said several counties respec-
tively.
W. VA. CONST. art. II, § 1.
82 See text at notes 137-141, infra.
83 W. VA. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1863).
84 See infra note 139 & accompanying text.
85 The section reads, in its entirety:
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cases or that classify a narrow class of individuals, groups, or entities for special
treatment. 'Local laws' limit their application to a specific locale within the
State, rather than apply statewide. Thus, special laws classify by persons,
places, or things, and local laws classify by places., 86 The notion is that general
laws are preferred because they reduce the potential for favoritism and discrimi-
nation87 and promote "uniformity and consistency in statutory enactments. ' 88 In
Local Laws Not to Be Passed in Enumerated Cases. The Legislature shall
not pass local or special laws in any of the following enumerated cases; that is
to say, for
Granting divorces;
Laying out, opening, altering and working roads or highways;
Vacating roads, town plats, streets, alleys and public grounds;
Locating, or changing county seats;
Regulating or changing county or district affairs;
Providing for the sale of church property, or property held for charitable uses;
Regulating the practice in courts of justice;
Incorporating cities, towns or villages, or amending the charter of any city
town or village, containing a population of less than two thousand;
Summoning or impaneling grand or petit juries;
The opening or conducting of any election, or designating the place of voting;
The sale and mortgage of real estate belonging to minors, or other under dis-
ability;
Chartering, licensing, or establishing ferries or toll bridges;
Remitting fines, penalties or forfeitures;
Changing the law of descent;
Regulating the rate of interest;
Authorizing deeds to be made for land sold for taxes;
Releasing taxes;
Releasing title to forfeited lands.
The Legislature shall provide, by general laws, for the foregoing and all other
cases for which provision can be so made; and in no case shall a special act be
passed, where a general law would be proper, and can be made applicable to
the case, nor in any other case in which the courts have jurisdiction, and are
competent to give the relief asked for.
W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 39.
86 BASTESS, supra note 11, at 165-66 (citing State ex rel. Appalachian Power Co. v. Gainer,
149 W.Va. 740, 757-58, 143 S.E.2d 351,363 (1965); Tweel v. West Virginia Racing Comm., 138
W.Va. 531, 546-47, 76 S.E.2d 874, 883 (1953)).
87 Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring):
[T]here is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreason-
able government than to require that the principles of law which officials
would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally. Conversely, noth-
ing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials
to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation and thus to
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addition, the provision promotes efficiency, localism, and separation of power
goals through its enumeration of eighteen subjects that the Legislature is com-
pletely prohibited from using special or local laws to regulate because the sub-
ject is too trivial to merit legislative time, or concerns only local matters, or re-
lates to a matter that should be controlled by another branch.89 As to all other
subjects, the Legislature must use general laws whenever it "would be proper."
The Court has loosely applied that latter requirement and has deferred to the
Legislature's judgment that a general law was not feasible so long as that judg-
ment was reasonable.90 As such, the constraint has had a minimal impact on the
Legislature's regulatory capability.
Five of the enumerated subjects concern local government matters, al-
though only two are relevant to the present purpose.91 The first of those prohib-
its statutes "[i]ncorporating cities, towns or villages, or amending the charter of
any city, town or village, containing a population of less than two thousand[.]"
The framers' reason for including this as a prohibited subject was undoubtedly
escape the political retribution that might be visited upon them if larger num-
bers were affected. Courts can take no better measure to assure that laws will
be just than to require that laws be equal in operation.
88 See, e.g., State ex rel. Taxpayers Protective Ass'n v. Hanks, 157 W.Va. 350, 352, 201
S.E.2d 304, 306 (1973); Brozka v. County Ct. of Brooke County, 111 W.Va. 191, 193, 160 S.E.
914, 915 (1931).
89 BASTRESS, supra note 11, at 166.
90 Id. at 166-67. The standard of review has not been completely toothless, however. Con-
sider the following:
A statute violates § 39 when it fails to operate uniformly on a class. Thus, the
[S]upreme [C]ourt struck down a law that varied magistrates' pay by county of
residence, grouping the counties according to population, but arbitrarily plac-
ing a handful of counties in a level with counties that were not of the same ap-
proximate size. State ex rel. Longanacre v. Crabtree[,177 W. Va. 132, 350
S.E.2d 760] (1986). Moreover, to satisfy section 39, a population classifica-
tion must be 'natural, reasonable and appropriate to the purpose of the statute.'
Accordingly, a legislative authorization to tax hotel occupancy that was lim-
ited to Class I cities (those with more than 50,000 people) violated section 39
because there was no reason not to extend the tax authority to smaller com-
munities. State ex rel. City of Charleston v. Bosely[, 165 W.Va. 332, 340, 268
S.E.2d 590, 595] (1980) [(quoting Hanks, 157 W.Va. 350, Syl. Pt. 3, 201
S.E.2d 304 (1973))].
Id.
See also Hanks, 157 W. Va. at 358-59, 201 S.E.2d at 308-9 (statutory provision that allowed an
exemption for counties over 100,000 from a requirement that counties maintain Saturday hours for
their courthouse offices was arbitrary and bore no reasonable relationship to the Act's purposes
and therefore violated § 39).
91 The other three subjects from W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 39 are:
Laying out, opening, altering and working roads or highways;
Vacating roads, town plats, streets, alleys and public grounds;
Locating, or changing county seats;...
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based on the opinion that such matters were too trivial to warrant legislative
treatment rather than for respect for localism. That conclusion follows from the
fact that nowhere in the 1872 Constitution was there any limitation on the Legis-
lature's ability to revamp municipal governments for particular towns and cities
over two thousand, a power that the Legislature exercised with regularity until
1936, when the Home Rule Amendment forbade the practice. 92
The other relevant provision in § 39 prohibits local laws "regulating or
changing county or district affairs." The phrase has eluded clear definition from
our court; there are few cases interpreting it - none recently decided - and those
that have been rendered have produced some conflicting results. For example,
in State ex rel. Green v. Board of Education,93 the Legislature had enacted a law
requiring the Braxton County Board of Education to compensate Green for inju-
ries he had sustained while working for the Board. (Because of then-existing
sovereign immunity, Green could not successfully sue the Board.) The Court
agreed with the Legislature that the Board had a moral obligation to pay Green
but nevertheless concluded that the act related to a district affair and thus was
barred by § 39. The Court reasoned:
[T]o the extent that the statute directs the Board of Education of
Braxton County to reimburse realtor, the [L]egislature, in our
opinion, is regulating the fiscal affairs of the board. If such
regulation should be held valid in this case, the instant appro-
priation would be a stepping stone toward legislative direction
of the fiscal affairs of boards of education and other govern-
mental agencies of the State.
94
In addition, the Court has found that a statute dealing with business hours in
county courthouses is a regulation of county affairs.95
On the other hand, the Court in Herold v. McQueen, 71 W.Va. 43, 75
S.E. 313 (1912), confronted a statute that directed construction of a high school
in Nicholas County, established a board of directors to oversee it, and imposed a
tax on county residents to pay for it. The Court upheld the act, relying on the
improbable reasoning that it was not a law "regulating or changing" a district
affair; rather, it "only create[d]"something.96 The Legislature had made the plan
92 W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 39a; see text infra at note 104. For examples of affirmations of the
Legislature's power to restructure a city's affairs, see generally, Hood v. City of Wheeling, 85
W.Va. 578, 102 S.E. 259 (1920); Booten v. Pinson, 77 W. Va. 412, 89 S.E. 985 (1915).
93 133 W.Va. 750, 58 S.E.2d 279 (1950).
94 Id. at 755, 58 S.E.2d at 282; see also Broza v. County Court of Brooke County, I ll W.Va.
191, 195, 160 S.E. 914, 916 (1931) (statute amending Wellsburg's city charter to exempt its resi-
dents from obligation to pay county road tax was a special law regulating county affairs).
95 Hanks, 157 W. Va. at 358-59, 201 S.E.2d at 308-9.
96 71 W. Va. 43, 47, 75 S.E. 313, 315 (1912). The Court stated, in full, on this point:
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contingent on approval of the county's voters, but that was not a crucial fact.
We know this because the Court explicitly said so:
The legislature could have established the high school without
submitting the question to a vote of the people at all, and may
have submitted it to a vote only for the reason that it thought it
unwise to establish the school unless a majority of the voters of
the whole county were in favor of it.
97
In any event, a later case upheld a similar statute, directing construction of a
high school in Upshur County, in which the law did not afford the taxpayers of
the county the option to vote on the plan and the new taxes. 98 Another decision
upheld a statute directing the Kanawha County Court and the Kanawha County
Board of Education to provide $83,000 to help support the county library, even
though the library was already in existence and the act did not therefore "create"
it.99 The Court noted Herold's regulate/change - create distinction, but did not
offer an explanation as to why the statute did not affect a "change" in the
county's and district's fiscal affairs.
West Virginia law on the meaning of "regulating or changing county or
district affairs '' 1°t is obviously muddled. Much of it must also be considered
just plain wrong. It is untenable to conclude that a decision to build a particular
school to serve a particular county or local population and to assess the citizens
of that locality for the funds to construct the school does not pertain to "district
affairs." Concluding otherwise defeats § 39's purpose of preserving by some
The act does not attempt to regulate or change the county and district affairs
of Nicholas county. Such county and district affairs as the Legislature is inhib-
ited from regulating or changing by a local or special act, are still carried on in
that county under the general laws applicable alike to all the counties and dis-
tricts of the state. The act only creates a county high school, and provides for
its support by a tax to be levied on the taxpayers of the whole county. It does
not work a change in, or operate as a regulation of, the general county and dis-
trict affairs which already existed, but it is a creation of something in addition
thereto. It makes no change in the plan provided by general law for the crea-
tion of district high schools; and, under the general law, any two or more dis-
tricts of Nicholas county may still combine and establish district high schools.
Id.
97 Id. at 49-50, 75 S.E. at 316.
98 Casto v. Upshur County High Sch. Bd., 94 W.Va. 513, 517-18, 119 S.E. 470, 472 (1923).
99 Kanawha County Pub. Library v. County Ct., 143 W. Va. 385, 386, 391-405, 102 S.E.2d
712, 714, 716-24 (1958).
100 The term "affairs" is used, as well, in Article VI, § 39a to identify those things, "municipal
affairs," over which cities have home rule powers. Both §§ 39 and 39a concern subjects that the
Constitution directs should be addressed by the Legislature only through general laws and should
otherwise be decided at the local level. Thus, the interpretation of "county or district affairs" in §
39 would also affect the meaning of "municipal affairs" in § 39a.
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measure local decision-making on matters of strictly local concern and focusing
the Legislature on matters of statewide import.
Other states commonly make distinctions about "local" affairs and is-
sues in construing provisions analogous to § 39 and home rule laws. While their
decisions have produced diverse results, they have at least identified what ought
to be the relevant inquiries. Needless to say, they do not include determining
whether the state law has changed a local condition or created a local condition.
Rather, the criteria have concerned the impact of the particular sub-
ject,1 °'whether uniform treatment of the subject is needed, the relative breadth of
the subject, and whether it relates to administrative or procedural aspects of lo-
cal government.10 2 Applying those criteria, as well as common sense, allows the
conclusion that the phrase, "district or county affairs," would apply to attempts
by the Legislature to restructure a particular county government.
If this reasonable interpretation prevails, then one can safely conclude
that § 39 would not permit the Legislature to, say, provide for the consolidation
of Charleston and Kanawha County, but it would have nothing - at all - to say
about a general statute authorizing cities and counties to consolidate if they
choose to do so. Article IX, §§ 8 and 13 reinforce that interpretation.103
Section 39 deals only with special laws that interfere with county and
school district governance. The next section, Article VI, § 39a, now imposes
the same limitation on the Legislature regarding special laws and municipal
affairs of cities with over two thousand residents.
Article VI, § 39a - In 1936, West Virginia voters ratified Article VI, §
39a' 04 and home rule for municipalities. The section ended the legislative prac-
101 A decision whose impact would be primarily local would be more likely to be characterized
as a local (or, in § 39's terms, county or district) affair. The decision about whether to build a
school and to tax only locally to finance it would, for example, have an impact that is primarily
local.
102 MATTHEW BENDER'S ANTIEAU ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 21.05[l] at 21-31 (2d ed.
1977); Note, Conflicts Between State Statutes and Municipal Ordinances, 72 HARV. L. REV. 737
(1959); see generally ANTIEAU, supra, §§ 21.02 & 21.05[1]; OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR.,
HANDBOOK OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 105-127 (1982).
103 See text infra at notes 137-165.
104 The section reads, in its entirety:
Home Rule for Municipalities. No local or special law shall hereafter be
passed incorporating cities, towns or villages, or amending their charters. The
Legislature shall provide by general laws for the incorporation and govern-
ment of cities, towns and villages and shall classify such municipal corpora-
tions, upon the basis of population, into not less than two nor more than five
classes. Such general laws shall restrict the powers of such cities, towns and
villages to borrow money and contract debts, and shall limit the rate of taxes
for municipal purposes, in accordance with section one, article ten of the Con-
stitution of the State of West Virginia. Under such general laws, the electors
of each municipal corporation, wherein the population exceeds two thousand,
shall have power and authority to frame, adopt and amend the charter of such
corporation, or to amend an existing charter thereof, and through its legally
constituted authority, may pass all laws and ordinances relating to its munici-
[Vol. 108
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tice of adopting and amending charters for cities exceeding two thousand in
population and bestowed that authority on the cities themselves. In addition, the
section directed the Legislature to regulate municipalities by general laws and to
restrict municipal taxing and borrowing capabilities, thus limiting cities' reve-
nue raising capacities to only that specifically authorized by the Legislature. 105
On the other hand, the amendment apparently reversed Dillon's Rule, which had
been the common law default rule on municipal regulatory powers. The rule
was named after John F. Dillon, a nineteenth century jurist and legal commenta-
tor. He first articulated the rule in an 1872 treatise on municipal corporations.
The law, he said, was that such entities had no power except those expressly
granted by the Legislature, those necessarily or fairly implied from the express
grants, and those necessary to accomplish the city's objects and purposes - "not
simply convenient, but indispensable."'1 °6 The rule caught on in West Virginia
not long after its articulation, and the State Supreme Court soon applied it to
other local governments as well as cities. 10 7 As Professor Lorensen so aptly
described it, "Dillon's Rule is more than just a rule; it is a thought-way, an atti-
tude, and a mind-set that is pervasive and difficult to unseat."'0 8 Its endurance
might have been attributable to its "blessing of simplicity and the lure of reserv-
ing to the judiciary the power to substitute its policy choices for those of locally
elected officials." 1°9
The key language in § 39a provides that a city "may pass all laws and
ordinances relating to its municipal affairs" unless such law is "inconsistent or
in conflict with" the Constitution or state statute or regulation. This language
certainly seems to confer on cities a comprehensive home rule power - as indi-
cated by the section's title - limited only by specific legislative countermands
and the previously mentioned restriction on raising revenues. Despite the clarity
of the directive, the Supreme Court of Appeals continued to assert Dillon's Rule
and, in fact, cited § 39a in support of a narrow view of municipal power. In
Brackman's Inc. v. Huntington,"10 just seven years after the section's ratifica-
tion, the Court considered a challenge to an ordinance that precluded licensing
of bars within three hundred feet of a church or school. The State had licensed
pal affairs: Provided, that any such charter or amendment thereto, and any
such law or ordinance so adopted, shall be invalid and void if inconsistent or
in conflict with this Constitution or the general laws of the State then in effect,
or thereafter, from time to time enacted.
W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 39a.
105 See note 135, infra.
106 JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 237 (5 'h ed.
1911).
107 See generally Willard D. Lorensen, Rethinking the West Virginia Municipal Code of 1969,
97 W. VA. L. REV. 653, 658-64 (1995).
108 Id. at 658.
109 Id. at 659.
110 126 W. Va. 21, 27 S.E.2d 71 (1943).
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Brackman's to sell "non-intoxicating beer," but state law also authorized local
governments to license such establishments. Although the statute and the ordi-
nance were capable of co-existence without conflict, the Court struck down the
city's geographical qualification. According to that Court:
[M]unicipalities may only exercise powers not in conflict with
general law, unless the power to do so is plainly and specifically
granted. This principle has always prevailed, but is established
beyond question by Section 39(a) of Article VI of our Constitu-
tion, known as the Municipal Home Rule Amendment[".]1
One could question why, if the "principle ha[d] always prevailed," the Legisla-
ture and the voters felt it necessary to amend the Constitution to "establish" it
and why they would use the language that local laws will be invalid only "if
inconsistent or in conflict with" state law. Similarly, State ex rel. Plymale v.
City of Huntington 112 invalidated a city charter provision that permitted citizens
to submit to council an initiative ordinance by a petition signed by at least ten
percent of registered voters. State law, however, gave effect to such petitions
when they were signed by at least thirty percent of registered voters. Although
the relevant statute did not prohibit a more liberal procedure, the Court never-
theless found the ordinance to be "in conflict" with the state law and refused to
permit the local government to provide the enhanced rights to its citizens. The
ultimate irony, though, came in Toler v. City of Huntington,113 when the Court
voided a notice of claim ordinance, which barred any tort action against the city
unless the person injured by municipal negligence or wrongdoing gave the city
notice of the claim within thirty days of the injury. The case distinguished two
earlier decisions" 4 sustaining notice of claim ordinances because those cities
operated under legislative charters 5 that had authorized the ordinances while
Huntington was a home rule city and no statute sanctioned notice of claim ordi-
HI" Id. at 24, 27 S.E.2d at 73.
112 147 W.Va. 728, 131 S.E.2d 160 (1963).
113 153 W.Va. 313, 168 S.E.2d 551 (1969).
114 Thomas v. City of South Charleston, 148 W.Va. 577, 136 S.E.2d 788 (1964), overruled on
other grounds by O'Neil v. Parkersburg, 160 W. Va. 94, 237 S.E.2d 504 (1977); Thompson v.
City of Charleston, 118 W. Va. 391, 191 S.E. 547 (1937), overruled on other grounds by O'Neil
v. Parkersburg, 160 W. Va. 694, 237 S.E.2d 504 (1977).
115 Following the ratification of the Home Rule Amendment in 1936, the Legislature enacted a
new chapter of the West Virginia Code, Chapter 8A, to implement the amendment. The State
continued, however, to recognize city charters enacted by the Legislature prior to 1936, and those
cities continued to operate under the old municipal code in Chapter 8. Only if a city opted to
become a home rule city did it come within the Chapter 8A sphere. This duality created much
confusion and remained in place until 1969, when the Legislature rewrote Chapter 8 to create a
comprehensive and unified Municipal Code. See Lorensen, supra note 107, at 655-56.
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nances for home rule cities.'l 6 Quoting a long line of Dillon Rule cases and
authorities, the Court held:
A municipal corporation is a creature of the State, and can only
perform such functions of government as may have been con-
ferred by the Constitution, or delegated to it by the law-making
authority of the State. It has no inherent powers, and only such
implied powers as are necessary to carry into effect those ex-
pressly granted. 1
7
The Court reached that result despite the existence of West Virginia 8A-4-2,
which provided:
A city shall have the power to protect and promote the public
safety, health, morals and welfare by the exercise of the powers
granted by this article. The enumeration of powers and author-
ity granted in this article shall not operate to exclude the exer-
cise of other powers and authority fairly incidental thereto or
reasonably implied and within the purposes of this chapter; and
the provisions of this article shall be given full effect without
regard to the common-law rule of strict construction.
What would appear to have been, in the section's last clause, an attempt to abol-
ish Dillon's Rule simply failed.
A further irony to Toler is that it was decided the same day that the new
Municipal Code of 1969 took effect, which eliminated the old "legislative char-
ter" cities and made all cities home rule cities. 1 8 The Legislature took several
steps in that Act to try, once again, to liberalize municipal powers and provide
for meaningful home rule. First, it repeated in § 8-1-7 the directives that the
enumeration of powers was not to deny reasonably implied and incidental pow-
ers and that the chapter was to be applied without regard to the common law
rule of strict construction. Second, after the rejection of that rule, the Legisla-
ture added, "and particularly when the powers and authority are exercised by
charter provisions" created under the provisions of the Act. Third, the Legisla-
ture inserted a provision, § 8-1-6, that set forth (among other things) "rules of
construction" to be used in applying charter provisions alongside state law. The
116 Toler, 153 W.Va. at 316, 168 S.E.2d at 553.
117 Id. at 318, 168 S.E.2d at 554. The oft-noted void of inherent municipal power would seem
to have been filled by W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 39a's grant to a city to "pass all laws and ordi-
nances relating to its municipal affairs." Why that did not suffice to create an "inherent" power
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details of those rules are not needed for present purposes;" 9 suffice it to say that
the section limited invalidation of the charter provisions to instances where they
were "inconsistent or in conflict with" state law and certain provisions in the
Act were to be deemed to be general laws superseding charter provisions. The
rules thus direct flexibility in both the creation and application of municipal
laws and "an abundant respect for local autonomy. 120
Fourth, the definitional section of the Act provided the Legislature's
understanding of the meaning of "inconsistent or in conflict with," as that term
is used in § 8-1-6 and, presumably, in Article VI, § 39a. 12' The phrase "shall
mean that a charter or ordinance provision is repugnant to the constitution of
this state or to general law because such provision (i) permits or authorizes that
which the constitution or general law forbids or prohibits, or (ii) forbids or pro-
hibits that which the constitution or general law permits or authorizes."' 122 This
called for a much narrower basis for finding conflict preemption than prior case
law had prescribed. 23 Fifth, § 8-12-2(a) of the Act included among the munici-
pal powers accorded cities, in addition to other powers granted to them by the
Constitution and general laws, the plenary power and authority by charter provi-
sion not inconsistent or in conflict with [state law] to provide for the govern-
ment, regulation and control of the city's municipal "affairs[.]" The subsection
then lists eleven such "affairs" in very broad terms 124 and specifically states that
the list does not exhaust the possibilities for municipal regulation. It is also sig-
nificant that the section's introductory clause provides that the grant of power is
"[i]n accordance with the provisions of the 'Municipal Home Rule Amendment'
to the Constitution of this State[.]" Following the broad language of the first
subsection, § 8-12-2 proceeds to list fifty-seven additional, more specific pow-
119 As Professor Lorensen put it, "Reading the section demands patience and commitment."
Lorensen, supra note 107, at 665.
120 Id.
121 The Legislature's definition of a constitutional term would not likely be binding on the
Supreme Court. See, e.g., Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001) (the Court, not the
Congress, defines the substance of constitutional guarantees); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507, 519-24 (1997) (same); State ex rel. W. Va. Citizens Action Group v. W. Va. Econ. Develop.
Grant Comm., 213 W.Va. 255, 273-79, 580 S.E.2d 869, 887-93 (2003). That point is not signifi-
cant in this context, however, because the Legislature most certainly has the power to direct by
statute which municipal laws shall be valid so long as they are not "inconsistent or in conflict
with" state law and to then define the meaning of that phrase as a matter of statutory law. That is
what the Legislature has done. W. VA. CODE § 8-1-2(b)(9) (2003).
122 W. VA. CODE § 8-1-2(b)(9) (2003).
123 See, e.g., Plymale v. City of Huntington, 147 W. Va. 728, 729-36, 131 S.E.2d 160, 161-65
(1963); Lorensen, supra note 107, at 668-77.
124 The "affairs" include creating and discontinuing the city's business, incurring obligations,
acquiring and managing property, "the furnishing of all public services," and "the adoption and
enforcement of local police, sanitary and other similar regulations." W. Va. Code § 8-12-
2a(l)(3)(5)(10) (2003). Consistent with § 39, however, subsection 8-12-2(a)(6) authorizes only
such taxes and assessments "as have been or may be specifically authorized by the legislature."
W. Va. Code § 8-12-2a(6) (2003).
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ers. Finally, the Act's § 8-1 1-1(a)(1) sets forth that, to carry into effect the con-
ferred municipal powers, a city's "governing body. . . has plenary power and
authority to [make] and pass all needful ordinances, orders, bylaws, acts, resolu-
tions, rules and regulations not contrary to the constitution and laws of this
state[.]"
The net effect of these various provisions is unmistakably clear: the
Legislature declared that Dillon's Rule is dead in West Virginia and that the
State's cities enjoy a plenary, broad, and flexible home rule authority. At least
one would think.
The Supreme Court of Appeals, however, showed some reluctance to
reach those conclusions, at least initially. In the first application of the new Act,
Rogers v. City of South Charleston125 considered whether a municipal board's
statutory grant of authority to "sell or convey" its real property included the
ability to convey an option to buy some of its realty. The Court rejected the
power; public corporations, it said, have only such power as are expressly ac-
corded them by the Legislature or as "arise[s] by necessary implication from the
express statutory grant." The opinion recognized the existence of § 8-1-7 but
said it only "relaxes the common law rule of strict construction" and "does not
lift all restrictions" on municipal power. 126 Similarly, both Sharon v. City of
Fairmont'27 and City of Fairmont v. Investors Syndicate of America, Inc.128 re-
peated as a syllabus point the Court's "familiar law regarding the limited powers
of municipalities" 129:
A municipal corporation has only the powers granted to it by
the legislature, and any such power it possesses must be ex-
pressly granted or necessarily or fairly implied or essential and
indispensable. If any reasonable doubt exists as to whether a
municipal corporation has a power, the power must be de-
nied. 130
That, of course, is the phoenix, Dillon's Rule.'
3
'
125 163 W.Va. 285, 256 S.E.2d 557 (1979).
126 Id. at 290, 256 S.E.2d at 561.
127 175 W.Va. 479, 334 S.E.2d 616 (1985).
128 172 W.Va. 431, 307 S.E.2d 467 (1983).
129 Sharon, 175 W.Va. at 487, 334 S.E.2d at 624.
130 Id. at Syl. pt. 2; City of Fairmont, Syl. Pt. 1, 172 W. Va. 431, 307 S.E.2d 691, quoting State
ex rel. Hutchinson, Syl. Pt. 2, 154 W.Va. 585, 176 S.E.2d 691 (1970).
131 One is reminded here of Justice Scalia's description of the "Lemon test"(from Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)) in cases under the First Amendment's Establishment Clause:
Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its
grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon
stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening the little
children and school attorneys of Center Moriches Union Free School District.
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The Court's more recent encounter with the scope of municipal power
demonstrated some respect for the Legislature's purpose and text in the 1969
Act. McCallister v. Nelson132 presented a challenge to a provision in Hunting-
ton's city charter that gave the mayor a veto power over ordinances passed by
city council. Although a state statute authorized the creation of a strong mayor
form of government, it did not explicitly provide for a mayoral veto. Thus, the
challengers contended that the charter exceeded the city's powers, citing the
above quote from Sharon. McCallister is not a model of clarity. The opinion
repeatedly cited with approval its prior decisions that strictly construed munici-
pal powers, it quoted three times some statement of Dillon's Rule without dis-
avowing it, and the Court included the Sharon syllabus point as its first syllabus
point. On the other hand, the Court did point out that, in spite of its syllabus
point, Sharon had held that a city could abate a nuisance pursuant to a statute
that permitted cities to eliminate "hazards to public health and safety" (really,
not a very surprising conclusion). McCallister also quoted §§ 8-1-7, 8-11-1, and
8-12-2, and based its second syllabus point on § 8-1-7. Thus, its second sylla-
bus point relies on a statute that was clearly designed to overrule its first sylla-
bus point. 1
33
Perhaps the decision's conclusion provides the more important element
to be derived from the case, or at least one can hope it is. After recounting the
cases' and statutes' positions on the rule of strict construction - without ac-
knowledging the incompatibility of those positions - the Court simply con-
cluded that it "can find no state law or constitutional provision violated by the
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
While resurrecting the Rule and apparel.dy ignoring § 8-1-7, the Court has also failed on occasion
to pay heed to the "rules of construction" stated in '§ 8-1-6. See Hogan v. City of South Charles-
ton, 164 W.Va. 136, 260 S.E2d 833 (1979); Lorensen, supra note 107, at 667-68.
132 186 W.Va. 131, 134, 411 S.E.2d 456, 459 (1991). That the "most recent encounter" was, as
of this writing, 14 years ago and that § 8-1-7 has only been interpreted twice since enactment of
the 1969 Act seems somewhat surprising. The infrequency of the Court's application of the stat-
ute, as well as the confusion in the Court's opinions when it has applied it, may have contributed
to the caution that the State's cities have generally shown in exercising home rule authority.
133 Id. at 135, 411 S.E.2d at 460. The Court also at one point quoted Perdue v. Ferguson, 177
W.Va. 44, 47, 350 S.E.2d 555, 559 (1986) for the proposition that, to prevail, "the challenger must
overcome a presumption that legislative enactments are immune from judicial interference. A
municipal council ..., when acting or attempting to act in a legislative capacity, upon a subject
within the scope of its powers, is entitled to the same immunity from judicial interference... as is
the state legislature." Perdue, however, dealt with the validity of an injunction against a city
council enacting an ordinance, not the review of an ordinance already enacted. There is no legis-
lative "immunity" from judicial review, as the Court has often proved. There is, or ought to be, a
"presumption" of validity that legislative enactments are generally accorded, out of judicial defer-
ence to a coordinate branch, but that presumption does not lead to an immunity. Furthermore, it
makes no sense for this so-called immunity to be of any relevance if it only attaches to enactments
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veto provision. The omission of a specific provision allowing a veto in the stat-
ute or Constitution does not mean it is forever forbidden."' 134 That is the inquiry
on which §§ 8-1-7, 8-11-1, and 8-12-2 attempt to focus the courts. The question
should be: is there some state law that expressly precludes this act - not is there
some law that expressly authorizes it? The McCallister Court could also have
made clear that structuring mayoral powers was within the city's "municipal
affairs" and thus expressly authorized by both Article VI, § 39a and § 8-12-2.
The Court, however, did not take advantage of the opportunity.
When construed as written and as ultimately applied in McCallister, the
Home Rule Amendment and the Municipal Code of 1969 combine to provide
cities with an enormous breadth of discretion and power (outside the revenue-
raising context 135) to structure and operate their governments. The Legislature
has already provided cities with five different forms of municipal govern-
ments 136 and can, of course, create more varieties, including, for example,
"metro" or city-county governments - so long as it does so generally.
Article IX, § 8 - This section provides that "no new county" may be
"formed" that does not contain at least four hundred square miles and at least six
thousand residents or that causes any existing county to fall under those minima.
The section also requires the consent of a majority of the voters in the proposed
county who vote on the question. 137 It and its predecessor provision in the 1863
134 McCallister, 186 W. Va. at 135, 411 S.E.2d at 460.
135 The constraints on West Virginia cities' - and counties' - revenue-raising alternatives
remain severe and need to be loosened. West Virginia is one of the few states in the country that
does not allow either a local sales tax or a local income tax. The principle revenue streams for
cities - the business and occupation tax, property taxes, and user fees - all have negative aspects
to them. See L. Christopher Plein & David G. Williams, Local Government Finance in West
Virginia 13 PUBLIC AFFAIRS RPTR. No. 3 (1996), available at
www.polsci.wvu.edu/ipa/par/report-13-3.html; Mehmet Serkan Tosun, Municipal Finance in
West Virginia: Forging a Course for Fiscal Stability, A West Virginia Public Finance Program
Project Report (2003), available at http://www.bber.wvu.edu/public-finance/publications.htm;
Kenneth A. Klase, Meeting Fiscal Challenges in the 1990s: Local Government Fiscal Trends in
West Virginia, 11 PUBLIC AFFAIRS Rpm. No. 2 (1994), available at
www.poisci.wvu.edu./ipa/par/reort 11 I2.html. West Virginia presently ranks 4 9 th among the
states in per capita local government revenues and local government tax revenues. STATE
RANKINGS 2005: A STATISTICAL VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES (Kathleen O'Leary Morgan & Scott
Morgan, eds., 16th ed. 2005).
The State also ranks very low in the support that it receives from state government. Tosun, supra,
at 26 (W. Va. has the lowest share of state revenue among total municipal revenues of any state in
the 13-state Appalachian region). Although Article X, § 6 of the West Virginia Constitution pro-
hibits the State from lending its credit to local governments or assuming their debts, it would not
(or should not) prevent the state from creating various kinds of programs, contracts, or grants that
could ease the crunch on local governments.
136 W. VA. CODE § 8-3-2 (2003).
137 The section states, in its entirety:
Formation of New Counties. No new county shall hereafter be formed in
this State with an area of less than four hundred square miles; nor with a
population of less than six thousand; nor shall any county, from which a new
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Constitution 138 have been invoked five times: In 1866, Mineral County was
sliced off Hampshire County and Grant off Hardy; the following year, Lincoln
County was patched together from four different counties, as was Summers
County in 1871; the last was the separation of Mingo County from Logan
County in 1895.139
Undoubtedly, what the drafters had in mind was the formation of a
county by taking territory away from, and thus reducing, pre-existing counties.
That is what states and counties did in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
No doubt, too, some people have read the section to preclude the formation of
counties by combining them, since commissions have twice proposed a constitu-
tional amendment to authorize county consolidation and one of those proposals
was actually voted on. 14° Nothing in § 8, however, requires that conclusion.
When two counties combine, they form a new county. That is precisely and
literally authorized in the language of § 8. In addition, the default rule of legis-
lative power - that the Legislature may accomplish any end by any means
unless prohibited by the Constitution - supports an interpretation of § 8 that is
enabling rather than disabling. Thus, if the Legislature wants to consolidate
counties, it may do so - so long as it satisfies the requirements of § 8: the result-
ing county must have more than six thousand people and four hundred square
miles 141 and its formation must be approved by the voters in the new county.
county, or part thereof shall be taken, be reduced in area below four hundred
square miles, nor in population below six thousand. Nor shall a new county
be formed without the consent of a majority of the voters residing within the
boundaries of the proposed new county, and voting on the question.
W. VA. CONST. art. IX, § 8.
138 W. VA. CONST. art. VII, § 12 (1863). The 1863 version was nearly identical to § 8 except
that the population minimum was 4,000 white residents.
139 E. LEE NORTH, THE 55 WEST VIRGINIAS: A GuIDE TO THE STATE'S COUNTIES 24, 46, 60, 62,
97 (2 nd ed. 1998). The creation of Lincoln County was challenged as unconstitutional on the
grounds that the county had less than the minima required for both population and square miles
and that it left Cabell County with fewer than 400 square miles. An amended act adding more
territory to Lincoln got it above the minima but most assuredly left Cabell too small, as it has only
282 square miles. Id. at 13. The Supreme Court of Appeals nevertheless rejected the challenge in
Lusher v. Scites, 4 W.Va. 11 (1870), reasoning that the counties' populations and sizes were facts
necessarily resolved by the Legislature prior to passing the relevant act and its findings were con-
clusive on the Court. Id. at 14-15. In a similar vein, the Court found the matter to be a political
question, that is, an issue that is committed to the political branches and not reviewable by the
courts. Id. at 17-21.
140 See supra notes 7, 29, 34-36 and accompanying text.
141 An interesting issue would be presented if the Legislature decided, and the voters agreed, on
the consolidation of the three counties in the northern panhandle. The combined square mileage
of Brooke (90), Hancock (85) and Ohio (106) Counties is 281. NORTH, supra note 139, at 11, 31
& 73. A literal reading of § 8 would, in that instance, preclude formation of the new county be-
cause it would have less than the 400 square mile minimum. A court could possibly conclude,
however, that the elimination of three very small counties to create a newer and larger county was
consistent with the purpose of the geographical minimum. A court could also follow the holding
of Lusher and conclude that the determination of sufficient size and the formation of a new county
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The procedure already in place in West Virginia Code § 1-3-1 for the "creation"
of a new county would be well-suited for use in consolidating counties.
Article IX, §§ 1 and 12 - Any statutory reorganization at the county
level would have to respect the constitutional, elective offices created by sec-
tions 1 and 12 in Article IX. Section 1 provides for election of a surveyor of
lands, a prosecuting attorney, a sheriff, and one or two assessors, 142 while § 12
requires the position and election of a clerk of the county commission. 143 Each
of these officers retains a degree of independence in meeting his or her constitu-
tional and statutory duties. 44 The offices cannot be eliminated without a consti-
tutional amendment. 145 Of course, any such county re-organization would need
to provide for officers or employees to perform the functions of those now per-
formed by the prosecuting attorney, sheriff, and county clerk.146 The continued
are strictly matters for the political branches and decline to review their decisions. See supra note
139.
142 Section 1 states, in its entirety: "The voters of each county shall elect a surveyor of lands, a
prosecuting attorney, a sheriff, and one and not more than two assessors, who shall hold their
respective offices for the term of four years." W. VA. CONST. art. X, § 1.
143 Section 12 states, in its entirety:
The voters of each county shall elect a clerk of the county commission, whose
term of office shall be six years. His duties and compensation and the manner
of his removal shall be prescribed by law. But the clerks of said commissions,
now in office, shall remain therein for the term for which they have been
elected, unless sooner removed therefrom, in the manner prescribed by law.
W. VA. CONST. art. IX, § 12
Article VIII, § 9 of the Constitution also requires the election in each county of a clerk of the
circuit court, who is a cog in the judicial system. See Rutledge v. Workman, 175 W. Va. 375, 332
S.E.2d 831 (1985). The Legislature has implicitly authorized counties to combine the two clerk-
ships, see W. VA. CODE § 7-7-4(d)(9) (2003), although at this time none of the counties has a joint
clerk. See W. VA. Assoc. OF COUNTIES, DIRECTORY OF COUNTY OFFICIALS (2005).
144 State ex rel. Lambert v. Cortellessi, 182 W. Va. 142, 146, 386 S.E. 2d 640, 644 (1989); cf.
Webster County Comm'n. v. Clayton, 206 W. Va. 107, 522 S.E.2d 201 (1999) (showing the limits
of such officer's power).
145 That is not the case for the offices referred to in Article IX, § 2, which is a constitutional
relic. The first sentence of that section provides for the election in each magisterial district of one
or more constables, a provision that was nullified by the 1974 Judicial Reorganization Amend-
ment. W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 15 (abolishing the offices of justice of the peace and constable).
The second sentence authorizes the assessor to appoint assistants, though such authority would be
implicit even without § 2 and would certainly be within the Legislature's capacity to create. (It
has done so in W. VA. CODE § 11-2-3 (2003)). The third sentence states: "Coroners, overseers of
the poor and surveyors of roads, shall be appointed by the county [commission]." While some
counties have coroners, most do not, and the other two mentioned offices no longer exist. See
State ex rel. K.M. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health and Human Res., 212 W. Va. 783, 792, 575 S.E.2d
393, 402 (2002); BASTRESS, supra note 11, at 226-27.
146 See Kenny v. County Ct. of Webster County, 124 W. Va. 519, 529-30, 21 S.E.2d 385, 390
(1942):
We cannot have constitutional government in the counties without [commis-
sions] for the control of their fiscal affairs; taxes must be collected, and there-
fore, we must have assessors and sheriffs; law and order must be preserved,
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utility of electing and maintaining a surveyor of lands in each county could cer-
tainly be questioned.
Article IX, §§ 9-11 - These three sections create county commissions,
specify the terms of office and qualifications of commissioners, and set forth
their powers. 147 They provide for three member commissions with members
and crime suppressed, therefore, we must have courts, not only to try persons
accused of crime, but settle disputes of a civil nature which arise between citi-
zens, and such courts must have clerical assistance; juries must be summoned
and paid; we must have officers to apprehend and prosecute alleged criminals;
jails must be built and maintained, and prisoners fed; and elections must be
held for the selection of officials, county, state and national. All these, and
many others which might be mentioned, are the mandatory expenses neces-
sary to the functioning of constitutionally required activities of county gov-
ernment[.]
Id.
On the other hand, many of the local government functions described by Kenny have in West
Virginia been taken over by or are dominated by the State. The Regional Jail Authority has totally
taken over from sheriffs the operation of jails, W. VA. CODE §§ 31-20-1 et seq. (2003); the state
police provides much of our law enforcement, W. VA. CODE §§ 15-2-1, et seq. (2004); the assess-
ment process is to a considerable extent state-administered, see W. VA. CONST. art. X, § lb; Killen
v. Logan County Comm., 213 W. Va. 602, 607, 295 S.E.2d 689, 694 (1982); and (as Kenny itself
recognized) the provision of welfare has entirely shifted from county overseers of the poor to the
.state and national governments. See State ex rel. K.M., 212 W. Va. at 795-96, 575 S.E.2d at 405-
06 (2002); infra notes 156-157 and accompanying text.
147 The three provisions state:
County Commissions
§ 9. The office of county court or tribunal in lieu thereof heretofore created is
hereby continued in all respects as heretofore constituted, but from and after
the effective date of this amendment shall be designated as the county com-
mission and whatever in this Constitution, the Code of West Virginia, acts of
the legislature or elsewhere in law a reference is made to the county court of
any county, such reference shall be read, construed and understood to mean
the county commission.
Except as otherwise provided in section eleven or thirteen of this article, there
shall be in each county of the State a county commission, composed of three
commissioners, and two of said commissioners shall be a quorum for the
transaction of business. It shall hold four regular sessions in each year, and at
such times as may be fixed and entered of record by the said commission.
Provisions may be made by law for holding special sessions of said commis-
sions.
Terms of Office of County Commissioners
§ 10. The commissioners shall be elected by the voters of the county, and hold
their office for at term of six years, except that at the first meeting of said
commissioners they shall designate by lot, or otherwise in such manner as
they may determine, one of their number, who shall hold his office for a term
of two years, one for four years, and one for six years, so that one shall be
elected every two years; but no two of said commissioners shall be elected
from the same magisterial district. If two or more persons residing in the
same district shall receive the greater number of votes cast at any election,
then only the one of such persons receiving the highest number shall be de-
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serving staggered six-year terms and each coming from a different magisterial
district. The enumeration of their powers in § 11 essentially leaves them with
whatever the Legislature gives them. All of the conferred powers are qualified,
in some fashion, by reference to what is prescribed by state law. Nevertheless,
it is clear that the commissions are to function as their county's executive and
legislative bodies, and the Legislature has placed on them a broad range of pow-
ers to superintend and administer the counties' affairs.1 48 The Commissions'
powers have been subjected to Dillon's Rule; thus, they may exercise only ex-
press powers and those necessarily implied for the execution of the express
clared elected, and the person living in another district, who shall receive the
next highest number of votes, shall be declared elected. Said commissioners
shall annually elect one of their number as president. The commissioners of
said commissions, now in office, shall remain therein for the term for which
they have been elected, unless sooner removed therefrom, in the manner pre-
scribed by law.
Powers of County Commissions
§ 11. The county commissions, through their clerks, shall have the custody of
all deeds and other papers presented for record in their counties, and the same
shall be preserved therein, or otherwise disposed of, as now is, or may be pre-
scribed by law. They shall also, under such regulations as may be prescribed
by law, have the superintendence and administration of the internal police and
fiscal affairs of their counties, including the establishment and regulation of
roads, ways, bridges, public landings, ferries and mills, with authority to lay
and disburse the county levies: Provided, that no license for the sale of intoxi-
cating liquors in any incorporated city, town or village, shall be granted with-
out the consent of the municipal authorities thereof, first had and obtained.
Until otherwise prescribed by law, they shall, in all cases of contest, be the
judge of the election, qualification and returns of their own members, and of
all county and district officers, subject to such regulations, by appeal or oth-
erwise, as may be prescribed by law. Such commissions may exercise such
other powers, and perform such other duties, not of a judicial nature, as may
be prescribed by law. Such existing tribunals as have been heretofore estab-
lished by the legislature to act as to police and fiscal matters in lieu of county
commissions in certain counties shall remain and continue as now constituted
in the counties in which they have been respectively established until other-
wise provided by law, and they shall have and exercise the powers which the
county commissions have under this article, and, until otherwise provided by
law, such clerk as is mentioned in section twelve of this article shall exercise
any powers and discharge any duties, heretofore conferred on, or required of,
any such tribunal or the clerk of such tribunal respecting the recording and
preservation of deeds and other papers presented for record and such other
matters as are prescribed by law to be exercised and discharged by the clerk
thereof.
W. VA. CONST. art. IX, §§ 9-11.
148 Most of the powers and duties are set forth in W. VA. CODE §§ 7-1-1, et seq. (2003). As
noted above, one of the defeated 1989 amendments sought to authorize the Legislature to confer
home rule powers on counties. As also noted above, nothing in the constitution prevents the Leg-
islature from bestowing those powers without a constitutional amendment.
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powers. 49 Of course, the Legislature remains free to enhance commission pow-
ers or to confer a broad home rule power analogous to that bestowed on munici-
palities. 1
50
Article IX, § 13 - This section authorizes counties to fashion "another
tribunal for the transaction of business" assigned to county commissions.151 The
adoption of an alternative tribunal ultimately depends on its approval by the
county's voters, but there are two methods by which the proposal can be initi-
ated. A county commission may itself request the Legislature for an act to
change the form of its county government and to submit the question to a refer-
endum. Citizens of the county may also submit a petition, signed by at least ten
percent of the county's registered voters, to the commission to direct it to make
the request to the Legislature. Neither the commission nor the Legislature has
discretion to deny the request, and the resulting legislation must propose a re-
form that reflects the citizens' original petition. 1
52
Obviously, § 13 offers opportunity for local government reform. Its
procedures are strictly bottom-up, however; the reform movement must come
from either the county's citizens or governing body. That does not mean, how-
ever, that the state government could not facilitate reform. The Legislature
could, for example, create a menu of different forms of government, much like
it has done for cities in West Virginia Code § 8-3-2.113 Alternatives could in-
149 E.g., State ex rel. County Ct. of Cabell County v. Arthur, Syl. Pt. 1, 150 W. Va. 293, 145
S.E.2d 34 (1965); Berkeley County Comm'n. v. Shiley, 170 W. Va. 684, 685, 295 S.E.2d 924,
926 (1982). On Dillon's Rule, see supra notes 106-117, 130-131 and accompanying text.
150 See supra notes 68, 70-71, 74-75 and accompanying text.
151 Section 13 reads, in its entirety:
Reformation of County Commissions
The legislature shall, upon the application of any county, reform, alter or mod-
ify the county commission established by this article in such county, and in
lieu thereof, with the assent of a majority of the voters of such county voting
at an election, create another tribunal for the transaction of the business re-
quired to be performed by the county commission created by this article.
Whenever a county commission shall receive a petition signed by ten percent
of the registered voters of such county requesting the reformation, alteration
or modification of such county commission, it shall be the mandatory duty of
such county commission to request the legislature, at its next regular session
thereafter, to enact an act reforming, altering or modifying such county com-
mission and establishing in lieu thereof another tribunal for the transaction of
the business required to be performed by such county commission, such act to
take effect upon the assent of the voters of such county, as aforesaid. When-
ever any such tribunal is established, all of the provisions of this article in re-
lation to the county commission shall be applicable to the tribunal established
in lieu of said commission. When such tribunal has been established, it shall
continue to act in lieu of the county commission until otherwise provided by
law.
W. VA. CONST. art. IX, § 13.
152 Taylor County Comm'n. v. Spencer, 169 W. Va. 37, 43-49, 285 S.E.2d 656, 660-63 (1981).
153 The Supreme Court made the same suggestion in Spencer. Id. at 44, 285 S.E.2d at 660.
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clude a metro (or joint city-county) government and variations on the municipal
forms in § 8-3-2. Hampshire County citizens, for example, have recently peti-
tioned for a vote on a proposed reform that would create a county government
very similar to that described in Plan IV, the "Manager Plan," with tribunal
members being elected by their respective voting districts and then hiring a
county administrator to handle the county's day-to-day business. Members' pay
would be limited to $250 for each tribunal meeting attended. 154
A significant issue arises in applying § 13 as to whether there are any
limits on or requirements regarding the form of the altered government. Section
13 itself places none, except that the new government must be "another tribu-
nal." The word, "tribunal," at first seems an odd choice because its most typical
usage is as a court of justice or as a place of judgment or decision. 155 When §
13's original antecedent was drafted, however, the county commission was
called the county court, and it exercised considerable judicial powers. That an-
tecedent, Article VIII, § 34 of the Constitution adopted in 1872, became Article
VIII, § 29 following an 1880 amendment, which took away almost all of the
county courts' judicial power. The current version was adopted in the Judicial
Reorganization Amendment of 1974, which renamed the county courts as
county commissions, moved the provisions relating to them from Article VIII
(the Judicial Article) to Article IX (the County Organization Article), and took
away almost all of their judicial powers. 156 That Amendment also took the old
Article VIII, § 29 and made it the current Article IX, § 13, adding to it the pro-
cedure for the reform to be initiated by citizen petition. Through each version of
the provision, the language of "another tribunal" remained, even though the
judicial functions of county courts/commissions had been eliminated. The cur-
rent Article IX, § 11, which was also part of the 1974 Amendment, provides for
the continuation of "such existing tribunals as have been heretofore established
by the Legislature to act as to police and fiscal matters in lieu of county com-
missions., 1 57 It thus seems clear that the term, "another tribunal," simply refers
154 H.D. 4396, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2004); S. 727, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va.
2004); H.D. 3291, 77th Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2005).
155 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2nd ed. 1989, unabridged),
http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/entry/50257514?single=l &queryjtype=word&queryword=tribunal
&first= 1 &maxto show= 10; RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2019 (2nd
ed. 1987, unabridged).
156 After the 1880 Amendment, the only judicial powers retained by the county courts related to
probate and the appointment and oversight of personal representatives, guardians, committees, and
similar issues. With the 1974 amendment, Article IX, § 11 now expressly prohibits the Legisla-
ture from assigning commission duties "of a judicial nature." Article VII, § 6 authorized the
Legislature to confer jurisdiction over probate and personal representatives, etc., on the circuit
courts, "but until such time as the legislature provides otherwise, jurisdiction in such matters shall
remain in the county commissions or tribunals existing in lieu thereof or the officers of such
county commission or tribunals." The Legislature has not taken that action, so those judicial
duties remain with the commissions/tribunals. See generally BASTRESS, supra note 11, at 234-35.
157 See also W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 6, discussed supra note 156.
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to an executive/legislative body that performs the duties of a county commission
but has a different form than that described in Article IX, § 10 and does not im-
pose any inherent limitations on that body's form.
The purpose of § 13 is obviously to maximize the democratic power of
the people and to put into action the mandate of its philosophical counterpart,
Article III, § 3, which confers on "a majority of the community "an indubitable,
inalienable, and indefeasible right to reform, alter or abolish [its government] in
such manner as shall be judged most conducive to the public weal.' 58 Given
those aims, the section should be interpreted to provide the people with the
maximum amount of flexibility and discretion in shaping the form of their al-
tered government, i.e., to let the people have their way.
That leads to the remaining question, then, whether the Constitution
elsewhere places limits on the form of the alternative tribunal. Certainly, basic
due process and equal protection constraints would apply; a county could not,
for example, create a body that was elected by a procedure that arbitrarily ex-
cluded a particular group or that violated one-person-one-vote principles. Other
provisions of the Bill of Rights would also control.1 59 Another possible limita-
tion, however, might be found in Article IX, § 10. That section says that the
"commissioners shall be elected by the voters of the county." That language
would likely require that a "tribunal in lieu of a commission" should be elected.
It would be odd, indeed, if § 13's design to maximize democracy resulted in a
diminution of democratic rights, even if consented to. The Supreme Court of
Appeals has ruled that there are certain fundamental rights that the majority
cannot waive for the minority. 16 It also concluded in Dunham v. Morton161 that
the language in § 10's predecessor provision (that county court members "shall
be elected") precluded the Legislature from authorizing the governor to choose a
winner in a tied election for county judge; only the people could elect commis-
sion members.
A democratically elected tribunal, however, should be the only require-
ment imposed by § 10. A possible additional limitation has been inferred by a
1963 Attorney General Opinion and has become an issue in the previously re-
ferred to petition from Hampshire County citizens. That petition proposes that
each tribunal member be elected by the voters within his or her own district
158 Indeed, the Supreme Court ventured in Spencer that § 3 by itself gave county residents the
right to alter their form of government. Spencer, 169 W. Va. at 44, 285 S.E.2d at 661.
159 E.g., W. VA. CONST. art. III, §§ 7 (freedom of speech) and 11 (political tests condemned)
would not permit the altered government to condition membership in the tribunal on taking a
political oath.
160 Woodruff v. Bd. of Trustees, 173 W. Va. 604, 610-11, 319 S.E.2d 372, 378-79 (1984) (Arti-
cle II, § l's statement that individuals "cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity"
of certain fundamental rights would not permit public employees' union to waive its members'
free speech rights); see also W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) ("funda-
mental rights may not be submitted to vote").
161 115 W. Va. 310, 313, 175 S.E. 787, 788 (1934).
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rather than by the voters countywide, as occurs with county commissions.
When the Attorney General was asked whether a district-based election of an
alternative form of government was constitutional, his reply was that the lan-
guage, "the [commissioners] shall be elected by the voters of the county," re-
quired countywide voting of even tribunals in lieu of commissions. 162 He also
relied on two cases, neither of which was particularly pertinent. One, the just
mentioned Dunham v. Morton, simply said that the people, not the governor,
must break a tie in an election for commissioner. The case tells us nothing
about who "the people" must be. The second case, McKee v. Hedrick,163 found
unconstitutional a statute that divided Ohio County into residential districts for
the election of commissioners. The residential districts differed from the
county's magisterial districts and thus made it possible for more than one person
to be elected from one magisterial district. That put the law in conflict with §
10's requirement that no more than one commissioner may reside in any one
magisterial district. Regardless of whether that decision was correct (the Court
could have said the second district resident elected was disqualified without
nullifying the statute), it says nothing, and provides no guidance, about county-
wide versus district elections of tribunals.
In resolving this issue, the first question is whether § 10 has any impact,
at all, on the form of a § 13 tribunal. I posited above that the requirement that a
commission be elected should carry over to § 13, not so much because of the
language of § 10, but because of the purposes of § 13. A requirement, though,
that the commission or tribunal members be elected "by the voters of the
county" does not necessarily mean that each of the members must be elected by
all of the county's voters. Obviously, § 10 has been interpreted to prescribe
countywide voting for traditional commissions, but the rest of the section in-
cludes language (especially the district residency requirement) that makes that
interpretation illogical. Nothing in the text of the Constitution, however, sug-
gests that that limitation must be carried over to § 13 tribunals. In the absence
of a textual command, the default rule should be to facilitate flexibility and the
wishes of the people. Most importantly, there is no principle of democracy that
requires either countywide or district voting; each has its advantages, and the
choice should depend on local priorities. Countywide voting makes for perfect
equality in the weight of each vote (everyone's vote counts exactly the same)
and every voter gets a say on each of the tribunal's members. On the other
hand, district specific voting allows each community to select its own represen-
tative to be its advocate, prevents population-dense areas from dominating the
voting on the tribunal, enhances voter familiarity with the candidates, and
maximizes the opportunity for racial, ethnic, religious, and political minorities
162 50 BIENNIAL REP. & OFF. OPS. OF THE A.G. OF W. VA. 202, 204 (1963).
163 McKee v. Hedrick, 146 W. Va. 777, 123 S.E.2d 227 (1961).
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to elect one of their own. 64 Of course, the districts would have to be suffi-
ciently equal in population to satisfy federal and state one-person-one-vote stan-
dards.165 Such compliance would also offset to some extent one of the advan-
tages of at-large voting.
In brief, § 13 offers significant potential for local government reform,
particularly if it is given a broad interpretation to facilitate flexibility and diver-
sity in structuring county government.
Article X, § 6 - The finance article (Article X) contains a few provi-
sions that must be kept in mind in pursuing local government reform. One is §
6, which bars the State from lending its credit or assuming the liabilities of its
local governments. 66 This would not, however, preclude the State from direct-
ing its revenues to local government for the creation, maintenance, or operation
of particular programs. 167 In addition, the Court has construed § 6 and its sister
section, § 4 (limiting state borrowing), 68 to permit the issuance of state or local
government bonds where the bonds are to be repaid by third parties, by the
funded projects, or by some dedicated fund outside general revenues. 169 Voters
164 See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 616-17 (1982); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446
U.S. 55, 66 (1980), superseded by statute on other grounds by, Voting Rights Act § 2, as recog-
nized in, Latino Political Action Comm. v. Boston, 784 F.2d 409 (1986).
165 See generally Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182 (1971); Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist., 397 U.S.
50 (1970); State ex rel. Smith v. Gore, 150 W. Va. 71, 143 S.E.2d 791 (1965). If a state or local
apportionment deviates less than 10% from perfect equality, it is sufficient to satisfy equal protec-
tion standards. Percentages larger than that must be justified, and a 17% deviation approaches the
maximum that can be permitted. E.g., Brown v. Thompson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983); Mahan v.
Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Deem v. Manchin, 188 F.
Supp. 2d 651 (N.D.W.V. 2002) (3-judge court).
166 Section 6 states, in its entirety:
The credit of the State shall not be granted to, or in aid of any county, city,
township, corporation or person; nor shall the State ever assume, or become
responsible for the debts or liabilities of any county, city, township, corpora-
tion or person. The investment of state or public funds shall be subject to pro-
cedures and guidelines heretofore or hereafter established by the Legislature
for the prudent investment of such funds.
W. VA. CONST. art. X, § 6.
167 See State ex rel. W. Va. Citizens Action Group v. W. Va. Econ. Dev. Grant Comm'n., 213
W. Va. 255, 580 S.E.2d 869 (2003).
168 Section 4 provides:
No debt shall be contracted by this State, except to meet casual deficits in the
revenue, to redeem a previous liability of the State, to suppress insurrection,
repel invasion or defend the State in time of war; but the payment of any li-
ability other than that for the ordinary expenses of the State, shall be equally
distributed over a period of at least twenty years.
W. VA. CONST. art X, § 4.
169 See, e.g., Winkler v. Sch. Bldg. Auth., 189 W. Va. 748, 756-57, 434 S.E.2d 420, 428-29
(1993); State ex rel. Marockie v. Wagoner, 190 W. Va. 467, 472, 438 S.E.2d 810, 815 (1993),
overruled on other grounds by State ex rel. W. Va. Reg'l Jail & Corr. Facility Auth. v. W. Va.
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can also approve a local government bond sales, up to five percent of the value
of taxable property within the jurisdiction.170 In other words, to the extent that
governmental reforms hinge on financing, the Constitution precludes some op-
tions, but it is not a bar.
Article X, § 9 - Section 9171 of Article X requires municipal taxes to be
"uniform, with respect to persons and property" within the city. This provision
does not present any particular legal difficulty, but it may have some political
impact for efforts to create city-county governments. Some metropolitan gov-
ernments, most notably Nashville, have assuaged rural residents through the
creation of lower tax zones. 72 That situation currently prevails in West Virginia
because Article X, § 1 prescribes a lower cap for taxes on nonresidential prop-
erty outside municipalities than for taxes on such property within cities. Any
efforts at creating city-county governments in the State would have to resolve
the tension between sections 1 and 9 of Article X.
A tax satisfies § 9's uniformity when it taxes persons at an equal rate or
taxes all property within each of the classes created by Article X, § 1 in the
same proportion to its value and at an equal rate. 173 The section does not apply
to license and privilege taxes, user fees, special assessments, and the like.
174
Article X, § 10 and Article XH, §§ 3, 6, and 10 - Any effort to re-
structure local government must consider the potential impact on the local
school system. Article XII, the education article, imposes in its first section a
duty on the Legislature to provide "for a thorough and efficient system of free
schools," and our Supreme Court has construed that provision (along with Arti-
cle XII, § 5's requirement that the Legislature provide for the support of free
schools) to create a fundamental right for every West Virginia child to receive a
free, quality education. 75 Section 2 of the Article creates the State Board of
Education and assigns it the responsibility for "the general supervision of the
free schools of the State" and for electing a State Superintendent of Schools,
who shall serve at the Board's "will and pleasure" and "be the chief school offi-
cer of the State" with such powers and duties as the Legislature and Board shall
Inv. Mgmt. Bd., 203 W. Va. 413, 508 S.E.2d 130 (1998); see generally BASTRESS, supra note 11,
at 250-55.
170 W. VA. CONST. art. X, § 8.
171 Section 9 reads, in its entirety: "Municipal Taxes to be Uniform. The legislature may, by
law, authorize the corporate authorities of cities, towns and villages, for corporate purposes, to
assess and collect taxes; but such taxes shall be uniform, with respect to persons and property
within the jurisdiction of the authority imposing the same." W. VA. CONST. art X., § 9.
172 DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS 96 (2nd ed. 1995).
173 Killen v. Logan County Comm'n., 170 W. Va. 602, 295 S.E.2d 689 (1982); Article V, § 39a
states that the Legislature "shall limit the rate of taxes for municipal purposes, in accordance with"
Article X, § 1. Id.
174 See generally BASTRESS, supra note 11, at 259-60.
175 E.g., Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W. Va. 672, 674, 255 S.E.2d 859, 861 (1979); Randolph County
Bd. of Educ. v. Adams, 196 W. Va. 9, 14,467 S.E.2d 150, 154 (1995).
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give him. Section 6176 addresses school districts, but provides only that those
districts in existence at the time of ratification should continue until changed by
the Legislature and that school boards shall be elected in nonpartisan elections
and subject to magisterial district residency restrictions. Section 3177 adds that
the Legislature "may provide for county superintendents and such other officers
as may be necessary" to implement Article XII (emphasis added). The only
other relevant provision in Article XII is § 10,178 which states that no "inde-
pendent" school district179 or organization may be created without the consent of
a majority of voters in the district, or in each of the districts, from which the
new district is created.
Article XII thus imposes very few restrictions on the structure of local
education administration and leaves most of the configuring to Legislative dis-
cretion.
The Legislature has responded in various ways. West Virginia Code §
18-1-1 defines a "district" for purposes of the Code's chapter on public educa-
tion as a "county school district" and a "board" as a "county board of educa-
tion.' 80 Section 18-1-3 provides, "A school district shall include all the terri-
tory in one county." 181 This "county unit" approach to districting was estab-
lished in 1933, when the Legislature revamped local education structure by
abolishing the pre-existing school districts - of which there were 398, including
54 independent districts - and their governing boards and replacing them with
the 55 county districts governed by five-member boards, no more than two
members of which could come from the same magisterial district.182 Citizens
176 Section 6 provides:
The school districts into which any county is now divided shall continue until
changed pursuant to act of the Legislature: Provided, That the school board of
any district shall be elected by the voters of the respective district without ref-
erence to political party affiliation. No more than two of the members of such
board may be residents of the same magisterial district within any school dis-
trict.
W. VA. CONST. art. XII, § 6.
177 Section 3 provides: "The legislature may provide for county superintendents and such other
officers as may be necessary to carry out the objects of this article and define their duties, powers
and compensation." W. VA. CONST. art. XII. § 3.
178 Section 10 provides: "No independent free school district, organization shall hereafter be
created, except with the consent of the school district or districts out of which the same is to be
created, expressed by a majority of the voters voting on the question." W. VA. CONST. art. XII, §
10.
179 An "independent school district," according to the Supreme Court, is one that is carved out
of a county or magisterial school district. See generally Leonhart v. Bd. of Educ., 114 W. Va. 9,
14, 170 S.E. 418, 420 (1933); Herold v. McQueen, 71 W. Va. 43, 50, 75 S.E. 313, 316 (1912).
180 W. VA. CODE § 18-1-1 (2003).
181 W. VA. CODE § 18-1-3 (2003).
182 See generally CHARLES H. AMBLER, A HISTORY OF EDUCATION IN WEST VIRGINIA 610
(1951). The fairly revolutionary move to county districts sought to advance both efficiency and
equality goals and was no doubt facilitated politically by the fiscal crises created by the depression
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and taxpayers in the Charleston city independent school district challenged the
new law on the theory that it violated Article XII, § 10. They argued that, be-
cause § 10 required consent of the voters to create an independent district, then
it followed that the section also required voter approval to eliminate an inde-
pendent district. The West Virginia Supreme Court, however, rejected that ar-
gument, restricted the section to its literal meaning, and sustained the Legisla-
ture's decision to require the switch to the county unit without submitting the
question to local voter approval. 1
83
Since 1933, the State has to a limited extent constitutionalized the no-
tion of county-wide school districts. First, the 1986 amendment to § 6 imposing
magisterial district residency restrictions on school board members seems to
assume a county board. It would be odd, indeed, to return to magisterial district
or independent school districts and maintain a requirement that no more than
two members of the school board "may be residents of the same magisterial
district." Second, the Fair Educational Opportunities Amendment of 1982,
which amended Article X, § 10,184 lowered the level of voter approval needed to
contract indebtedness and issue bonds from sixty percent to a simple majority.
In doing so, however, the amendment stated, in relevant part:
... [A] county board of education may contract indebtedness
and issue bonds for public school purposes as provided by law,
if, when submitted to a vote of the people of the county, in the
manner provided by law, the question of contracting indebted-
ness and issuing bonds is approved by a majority of the votes
cast for and against the same.1 85
and by the contemporaneous enactment of the Tax Limitation Amendment, which limited the
ability of local governments to raise revenues through property taxes. Efficiency was indeed
promoted; in the first year of the county unit law, the districts employed 940 fewer teachers and
saved $4.56 million. Because there had been some rather significant disparities within counties,
especially in those counties with independent districts (which tended to be wealthier than the
magisterial districts), the switch to county units and uniform taxation across the county also pro-
moted the equality goal. Id. at 610.
183 Leonhart, 114 W. Va. at 16-17, 170 S.E. at 421.
184 The 1982 Amendment, which is now § 10's third paragraph, states as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section eight of this article relating to a vote
of the people or any other provisions of this Constitution, a county board of
education may contract indebtedness and issue bonds for public school pur-
poses as provided by law, if, when submitted to a vote of the people of the
county, in the manner provided by law, the question of contracting indebted-
ness and issuing bonds is approved by a majority of the votes cast for and
against the same.
W. VA. CONST. art X, § 10.
185 W. VA. CONST. art. X, § 10. (emphasis added).
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If this provision is read literally, it would authorize only county boards
to issue bonds, and votes to authorize the issuance of bonds must be held on a
county by county basis. If so read, a school district that was something more, or
less, than a county could not use § 10 but would have to rely on the pre-existing
authority in Article X, § 8 for a "school district" to issue bonds. That section is
more restrictive in several respects, most notably in its requirement that bonds
must be approved by a three-fifths supermajority rather than by a simple major-
ity. Hence, if the State wanted to consolidate or rearrange school districts into
something other than county school districts, then § 10 should be amended to
provide in its final paragraph that a "[district] board of education may contract
indebtedness and issue bonds" if approved by a majority in a vote of the "people
of the [district]." With that accomplished, a legislative decision to restructure
school districts could proceed unimpeded by any constitutional restraint, other
than the general requirements for equality and rationality.
Consolidation of school districts does, however, create policy issues that
are different from consolidation of counties and other local governments. A
major rationale behind such efforts would be to achieve some economies of
scale, eliminate duplication of some services, and reduce administrative costs.
In school consolidations, at least, the evidence has not revealed cost savings,'
86
while there is strong evidence now that smaller districts and smaller schools
substantially reduce the powerful negative effects that low socio-economic
186 See Robert M. Bastress, The Impact of Litigation on Rural Students: From Free Textbooks
to School Consolidation, 82 NEB. L. REV. 9, 45-47 (2003); Kathleen Cotton, New Small Learning
Communities: Findings from Recent Literature, NW. REG'L EDUC. LAB. (2002) (available from the
Nat'l Ass'n of Secondary Sch. Principals); James S. Streifel, et al., The Financial Effects of Con-
solidation, 7 J. RESEARCH RURAL EDUC. 13 (No. 2, 1991) (stating that "there is no reason to expect
financial savings or increased revenues as a result of consolidation"); Eric Eyre & Scott Finn,
Educational Agency Grows While Enrollment Shrinks, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Oct. 6, 2002,
available at http://www.wvgazette.com/section/Series/Closing+Costs/200210089; BARBARA KENT
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status has on student achievement. 187 And West Virginia is already one of the
few states to maintain county-wide school districts.
88
IV. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
A few additional points are relevant to structuring local government.
First, the Legislature has almost unlimited discretion in creating or authorizing
regional or statewide entities to perform governmental functions. Indeed, such
restructuring has already occurred in a wide variety of contexts in West Virginia
and elsewhere. Law enforcement, for example, was once entirely local, but has
since 1919 been in the partial domain of the state police. 189 The Regional Jail
Authority has almost completely taken over the operation of jails, which just
fifteen years ago were entirely the domain of county sheriffs. 90 Welfare, once
the responsibility of counties and their overseers of the poor, has since the de-
pression been taken over by the federal and state governments,' 9 1 although de-
livery of services often occurs through local agencies. Regional Education Ser-
187 See Bastress, supra note 186, at 38-41; CRAIG B. HOWLEY, THE MATTHEW PRINCIPLE: A
WEST VIRGINIA REPLICATION? 20, http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2/content
storage_01/0000000b/80/23/df/3d.pdf; Craig B. Howley, Compounding Disadvantage: The Ef-
fects of School and District Size on Student Achievement in West Virginia, 12 J. RESEARCH RURAL
EDUC. 25 (1996); Bradley J. McMillen, School Size, Achievement, and Achievement Gaps, 18
(2004), available at http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/v12n58/ 18; Robert Bickel & Craig Howley, The
Influence of Scale on School Performance: A Multi-Level Extension of the Matthew Principle 8
EDUC. POLICY ANALYSIS ARCHIVES 2 (2001), available at http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/v8n22/; JERRY
D. JOHNSON, et al., SIZE, EXCELLENCE, AND EQUITY IN ARKANSAS SCHOOLS: A MATTHEW
REPLICATION 33 (2002), http:l/www.eric.ed.govlERICDocs/data/ericdocs2/content-storage_-Ol/
00000OOb/80/Od/a53a.pdf ; Maine's Small Schools Cut Poverty's Power over Student Achieve-
ment, 1 (Feb. 2005) available at http://www.ruraledu.org/rpm/rpm702a.htm; RURAL SCHOOL AND
COMMUNITY TRUST, SMALL SOUTHERN SCHOOLS BEATING THE ODDS IN POOR RURAL
COMMUNmES 5 (2004), http://www.ruraledu.org/docs/beatingodds/SGAreport.pdf 5.
188 Maryland and Nevada also have county districts with one extra each for Baltimore and
Carson City, respectively; Louisiana has 66 districts and 64 parishes. U.S. CENSUS, STATE &
COUNTY QUICK FACTS, available at http:llquickfacts.census.govlqfd/index.html. Hawaii has one
statewide school district. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, OVERVIEW OF ELEMENTARY AND
SECONDARY SCHOOL DISTRICTS: 2001-02, Table A-5 (2003), available at
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2003/overview3/table-A5- 1 .asp
The West Virginia Legislature has regionalized some educational functions through the creation
of and reliance on Regional Educational Service Agencies, W. VA. CODE § 18-2-26 (2003), and
through the authorization of inter-county construction and maintenance of schools. W. VA. CODE
§ 18-5-11 (2003).
189 W. VA. CODE §§ 15-2-1, et seq. (2004).
190 W. VA. CODE §§ 31-20-1, et seq. (2003).
191 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 401, et seq. (2000) (Federal Old-Age, Survivors and Disability In-
surance Benefits); 42 U.S.C. §§ 601, et seq. (2000) (Grants to States for Aid and Services to
Needy Families with Children and for Child-Welfare Services); W. VA. CODE §§ 9-9-1, et seq.
(2003) (WV Works Act); see generally State ex rel. K.M. v. W. Va. Dept. of Health & Hum. Res.,
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vice Agencies - which (among other things) provide technical assistance, staff
development, and technological support to local school systems - have been
part of the State's educational system since 1972.192 And the Legislature has
authorized the creation of multi-county commissions to regulate a variety of
environmental issues, which do not respect political boundaries. These include
regional solid waste commissions1 93 and water and wastewater authorities.194
Regional libraries have also been sanctioned.1 95 Finally, the Legislature can
authorize cities and counties to enter into cooperative arrangements with other
governmental units to address shared problems in a more efficient and effective
manner. 
196
Another alternative readily available to the Legislature to facilitate ef-
fective local governance, without (perhaps) as much political resistance as, say,
county or city-county consolidation, is the use of laws that make annexation
easy for municipalities. For the same reasons that make metropolitan govern-
ments effective, cities with borders extended to absorb suburbs promote a vari-
ety of interests. The bigger the governmental unit, the more easily it can equita-
bly tax and redistribute wealth. Easy annexation also helps to avoid the phe-
nomenon, now common throughout West Virginia, of large retailers and malls
establishing businesses just outside city limits, enabling them to draw on a city's
population base for its business but avoiding both municipal property taxes and
business and occupation taxes, as well as other assessments. Larger cities, in
particular, provide a variety of cultural, recreational, and economic benefits that
nearby nonresidents can take advantage of but do not share equally with mu-
nicipal inhabitants in supporting them. Through their zoning and other regula-
tory powers, cities with expansive borders have an easier time reining in uncon-
trolled development, which has become a significant issue in growth areas, and
can better defend against elitist zoning practices. For communities with sizeable
minority populations, laws permitting easy annexation - or municipal "elastic-
ity" - also help to promote residential integration and to discourage white
flight. 197
192 W. VA. CODE § 18-2-26 (2003).
193 W. VA. CODE §§ 22C-4-1, et seq. (2005).
194 W. VA. CODE §§ 16-13D-1, et seq. (2001).
195 W. VA. CODE §§ 10- 1-3 - 3a (2003).
196 This has already been expressly done for counties, W. VA. CODE § 7-1-3i (2003) (county
commissions may cooperate with other governmental units to carry out any lawful purpose), and
both cities and counties have express authorization to contract with governmental subdivisions
across state lines for fire protection and emergency medical services. Id. (counties); W. VA. CODE
§ 8-12-5(57) (2003) (cities). Presumably, cities can enter into intergovernmental agreements as a
means for forwarding any of their enumerated powers. See supra notes 124-136 and accompany-
ing text.
197 All of the points made in this paragraph, and the use of the term "elasticity" to refer to a
city's annexation capability, are made and supported in RuSK, supra note 172. See also Richard
Briffault, The Local Government Boundary in Metropolitan Areas, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1115 (1996);
but see Edward A. Zelinsky, Book Review: Metropolitanism, Progressivism, and Race, 98
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Accommodating annexation means providing simple procedures for do-
ing so, avoiding difficult substantive prerequisites or criteria, and permitting the
municipal governments to annex without the consent of the voters or property
owners in the appended territory. 198 West Virginia presently provides three
methods for municipal annexation.' 99 The first, annexation by election, is initi-
ated only by a petition signed by five percent or more of a city's residence and
must be approved by a majority voting in both the city and the added territory.2 °°
The second method provides for annexation without an election, but that proce-
dure can only be initiated by a petition endorsed by a majority of the voters and
a majority of the freeholders in the proposed annexation territory. 20 ' The city's
determination regarding the sufficiency of the petition is reviewable by the
courts.20 2 The final alternative addresses "annexation by minor boundary ad-
justment, ' ,20 a term which the Code does not define. This process does not re-
quire a petition or an election; instead, the city must petition the county com-
mission for permission to annex the desired territory and include in its petition
various pieces of information about the territory and about the impact of the
annexation. If the petition meets the threshold requirements, then the commis-
sion must hold a special public hearing on the proposal. Thereafter, the com-
mission must render a decision, taking into account an array of specified crite-
ria, including "whether affected parties of the territory to be annexed oppose or
support the proposed annexation" and "whether the proposed annexation is in
the best interest of the county as a whole.
' 204
COLUM. L. REv. 665 (1998); Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL.
EcON. 416 (1956). Tiebout's work is the seminal argument for the modem public choice advo-
cates, arguing that smaller local governments enhance individual choice, citizen participation, and
diversity. The works cited here, as well as a wealth of literature, reflect an ongoing debate on the
sizing of local government.
198 See RuSK, supra note 172, at 20-22.
199 W. VA. CODE § 8-6-1, et seq. (2003).
200 W. VA. CODE § 8-6-2 (2003).
201 W. VA. CODE § 8-6-4 (2003). Subsection (f) of the provision states, "If all of the eligible
petitioners are qualified voters, only a voters' petition is required." According to subsection (b),
the term "qualified voter" includes "firms and corporations in the additional territory."
202 W. VA. CODE § 8-6-4(c).
203 W. VA. CODE § 8-6-5 (2003).
204 W. VA. CODE § 8-6-5(f) (2003). The subsection reads, in its entirety:
In making its final decision on an application for annexation by minor bound-
ary adjustment, the county commission shall, at a minimum, consider the fol-
lowing factors:
(1) Whether the territory proposed for annexation is contiguous to the corpo-
rate limits of the municipality. For purposes of this section, "contiguous"
means that at the time the application for annexation is submitted, the territory
proposed for annexation either abuts directly on the municipal boundary or is
separated from the municipal boundary by an unincorporated street or high-
way, or street or highway right-of-way, a creek or river, or the right-of-way of
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None of those procedures provides an easy mechanism to facilitate mu-
nicipal elasticity. Of course, a state may conclude that there are important coun-
tervailing interests, which could include ensuring that the city can meet infra-
structure and service needs 20 and preserving extant farmland, 2°6 and would ac-
a railroad or other public service corporation, or lands owned by the state or
the federal government;
(2) Whether the proposed annexation is limited solely to a division of high-
ways right-of-way or whether the division of highways holds title to the prop-
erty in fee;
(3) Whether affected parties of the territory to be annexed oppose or support
the proposed annexation. For purposes of this section, "affected parties"
means freeholders, firms, corporations and qualified voters in the territory
proposed for annexation and in the municipality and a freeholder whose prop-
erty abuts a street or highway, as defined in section thirty-five [§ 17C-1-35],
article one, chapter seventeen-c of this code, when: (i) The street or highway
is being annexed to provide emergency services; or (ii) the annexation in-
cludes one or more freeholders at the end of the street or highway proposed
for annexation;
(4) Whether the proposed annexation consists of a street or highway as de-
fined in section thirty-five [§ 17C-1-35], article one, chapter seventeen-c of
this code and one or more freeholders;
(5) Whether the proposed annexation consists of a street or highway as de-
fined in section thirty-five [§ 17C-1-35], article one, chapter seventeen-c of
this code which does not include a freeholder but which is necessary for the
provision of emergency services in the territory being annexed;
(6) Whether another municipality has made application to annex the same or
substantially the same territory; and
(7) Whether the proposed annexation is in the best interest of the county as a
whole.
W. VA. CODE § 8-6-5(0 (2003).
205 See, e.g., four of the required subjects that a city must address in petitioning a commission
for an annexation without election:
(3) A statement setting forth the municipality's plan for providing the addi-
tional territory with all applicable public services such as police and fire pro-
tection, solid waste collection, public water and sewer services and street
maintenance services, including to what extent the public services are or will
be provided by a private solid waste collection service or a public service dis-
trict;
(4) A statement of the impact of the annexation on any private solid waste col-
lection service or public service district currently doing business in the terri-
tory proposed for annexation in the event the municipality should choose not
to utilize the current service providers;
(5) A statement of the impact of the annexation on fire protection and fire in-
surance rates in the territory proposed for annexation;
(6) A statement of how the proposed annexation will affect the municipality's
finances and services[.]
W. VA. CODE § 8-6-5(c) (2003).
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cordingly want to provide safeguards to protect those interests. A good argu-
ment can be made, however, that West Virginia has created obstacles to annexa-
tion that are far greater than necessary to protect legitimate concerns about mu-
nicipal over-extension.
V. CONCLUSION
There are constitutional limits on the Legislature's ability to implement
local government reform. Most notably, the Legislature cannot impose reforms
on particular counties and cities, at least not without a constitutional amend-
ment. County reforms must originate in the county,2°7 and any attempt to adjust
city and county affairs must be accomplished by general laws.208 Nevertheless,
the Legislature has considerable discretion and flexibility in creating possibili-
ties for reform and in devising incentives to do so. As it has already done with
cities, the State can bestow home rule on counties and can provide them with a
selection of governing models. Home rule on the city or county level, however,
will require judicial cooperation; courts must end their miserly interpretation of
local governments' powers. The Legislature can also create regional bodies to
address problems that cut across political boundaries.
Moving toward consolidated governments and cooperative arrange-
ments provides greater opportunities to share resources, achieve efficiencies,
and promote equity. Any such effort, however, should include mechanisms to
preserve the advantages of small government: local self-determination, diver-
sity, governmental responsiveness to constituent concerns, citizen participation,
and sense of community. Such mechanisms include residency requirements for
election to city or county governing councils, 20 9 neighborhood associations or
boards to organize community events and to air and promote citizen concerns,210
and municipal outreach programs.
206 See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 8-6-1(b) (2003): "Any farmlands or operations as described in [W.
Va. Code § 19-19-1, et seq.] which may be annexed into a municipality shall be protected in the
continuation of agricultural use after being annexed."
207 W. VA. CONST. art. IX, § 13; see supra notes 151-165 and accompanying text.
208 W. VA. CONST. art. VI, §§ 39-39a.
209 The Constitution, in Article IX, § 10, already requires that county commissioners live in
diverse districts, and Article XII, § 6 imposes a similar requirement for school boards. Many
West Virginia cities also have precinct or district residency requirements for election to their
governing bodies. Such limits could, but should not, present issues about undue limitations on the
right of candidacy as established in a line of West Virginia Supreme Court cases. E.g., Marra v.
Zink, 163 W. Va. 400, 256 S.E.2d 581 (1979); Sturm v. Henderson, 176 W. Va. 319, 342 S.E.2d
287 (1986), superseded by constitutional amendment, W. Va. Const. art. XII, § 6, as recognized
in, Adkins v. Smith, 186 W. Va. 481, 408 S.E.2d 60 (1991); State ex rel. Billings v. City of Point
Pleasant, 194 W. Va. 301, 160 S.E.2d 436 (1995).
210 See RUSK, supra note 172, at 135-36.
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There are few constitutional barriers to local government reform or to
city/county home rule in West Virginia. The issues really lie in political will
and judicial cooperation.
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